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INTRODUCTION
The impressive growth of the Soviet Merchant Marine during
the past two decades. and its anticipated future expansion.
have given rise to questions concerning the likely future
impact of that fleet on world shipping and the relative
importance of maritime commerce to the Soviet Union itself.
U.S. owners and regulatory bodies-~ave. along with other
Western owners and shipping bodies. consistently pointed an
accusing finger at the Soviets for attempting to capture more
than a fair share of general cargo tonnage in the world liner
market. Charges of predatory Soviet rate cutting practices
have been widely advertised by American operators concerned
with the growing presence of Soviet carriers in the highly
competitive liner trades. At the same time. such claims are
made with little or no reference to the mushrooming of the
flags of convenience liner fleet, the comparative rates of
growth of other merchant shipping powers, and the added value
of the West's hugely dominant cellular container ship fleet.
This study examines the economic and political roles of
the Soviet Union1s Merchant Marine, and will address why and
to what extent Soviet shipping has expanded into the U.S.
liner trades. Key variables in Soviet merchant ship acquisi-
tion, maritime trade policy, and future behavior in this
context are also explored and developed.
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HISTORY
Prior to World War I, the Russian Merchant Marine con-
sisted of 1,040 ships with a total cargo capacity of less than
1 million tonso This number represented approximately 1.5
percent of the world1s merchant shipping total. Most of these
ships were technically obsolete or marginally competitive
coal burning steamships and sailing ves~els. The Russian
merchant fleet at that time comprised of an half dozen private
and semi-private companies, where German, French, and British
interests owned a considerable percentage of the joint stock
companieso Few cargoes destined for overseas ports were car-
ried in Russian vessels. Although three-quarters of Tsarist
Russia1s foreign trade was carried by seaborne commerce, only
7 percent was carried in domestic bottoms(Shadrin, 1972, p.281;
Harbron, 1963, p.140). Warehousing was practically non-existent
and virtually all cargo handling was done by manual labor(Bock,
1981, po42).
At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, many of
Russia1s merchant ships were serving with the Allies in the
war against Germany. A substantial number of these vessels were
confiscated by the allies of Tsarist Russia in an attempt to
protect private investments in joint stock ventures, and also
to deprive the Bolshevik revolutionaries of their
economic utility(Martin, 1975, p.25). In addition, a large
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number of merchant ships were taken overseas by the retreating
White Guards, or were lost or sunk as a result of World War I
sinkings and the Russian Civil War. Although some of the confis-
cated vessels were eventually returned, total losses exceeded
400~000 tons of merchant shipping~ over 40 percent of the pre-
war fleet. Those ships that remained in Soviet controlled ports
were damaged~ antiquated~ or in various stages of decay and
disrepair(Shadrin~ 1972, p.282). On Jan~ary 26, 1918, the
Congress of the Soviet People's Commissars nationalized all
shipping companies and their assets(Bock, 1981~ p.42). By the
time the fleet was counted in 1922, however, it was found that
only about a fifth of the steamers and approximately one tenth
of the sailing vessels had survived in Soviet control. The Far
East authorities could apparently muster no more than 10 ships
of any size(Fairhall, 1971, p.79).
In 1921, Stalin instituted the New Economic Policy which
allowed private ownership in certain steamship companies in an
effort to attract foreign capital. This plan was intended to
promote overseas market penetration and bolster trade for the
struggling economy of the new communist state, but in fact it
accomplished little for the merchant shipping industry. As a
result, shipbuilding orders for merchant hulls were placed in
shipyards outside of the Soviet Union(Martin~ 1975, p.26). The
Second Five Year Plan called for more merchant ships to be
built in domestic yards(Harbron, 1963, p.147). By 1934 the
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,merchant marine acquired 159 new ships with a total cargo
capacity of approximately 630,000 tons. More than half of
these new ships were Soviet built(Shadrin, 1972, p.287). The
decision to establish a separate People's Commassariat for
Water Transport in 1931 probably influenced this build-up,
and the merchant marine's subsequent growth, to a significant
degree. Prior to 1931, the Soviet merchant marine was
subordinated to the Commissariat of Ranroads. Under a bureau-
cratic agency more concerned with the development of domestic
land transportation services, the shipping lobby probably
experienced a difficult match against railway enthusiasts in
the competition for patronage.
After 1932, the effects of the early Five Year Plans and
bureaucratic reorganization became evident as the total cargo
turnover of the Soviet merchant marine reached the pre-revolu-
tion level (Shadrin, 1972, p.289). According to Lloyd's Register,
the Soviet merchant fleet grew from 412,459 tons in 1921 to
1,253,824 gross registered tons in 1937, an impressive growth
rate during years of world wide economic depression. Sixty
,pe r c e nt of the new tonnage was built by Soviet shipyards(Har-
bron, 1963, p.141). From 1929 to 1937, in particular, the
number of new ships built quadrupled compared with the nine years
period preceding World War I. In 1938, Soviet shipyards pro-
duced five times as many merchant vessels as in any previous
year. By 1939, Soviet yards were able to turn out as many ships
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in six months as the Russian Empire was capable of producing
in a decade prior to the World War I(Bock, 1981, p.43). By
1940, the tonnage of the Soviet commercial fleet approached 2
million tons, although the large proportion of coal burners
gave the fleet a dismally low average speed.
Despite severe losses during World War II, the Soviet
merchant marine was bolstered by the addition of 84 American
Lend Lease ships, and after the war the-USSR received 180
German and Italian vessels as war reparations. The Soviet
Union received almost one third of the surviving merchant
tonnage of the Third Reich, amounting to nearly 173,000 tons
(Ackley, 1973, p.236). In addition, 59 ships were acquired
from the former independent Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania(Mason, 1969, p.188). The final post-war result
was a Soviet merchant fleet consisting of 507 ships totalling
an estimated 2.7 million deadweight tons, a net increase of
over 300,000 tons from antebellum levels. Although many of
the ships were aging or obsolescent, they provided a basis
for the expanding economic endeavors of the post-war Soviet
state(Ackley, 1973, p.236; Martin, 1972, p.26). The U.S.
merchant fleet at this time was nearly nine times larger than
the Soviet fleet, exceeded it by almost twenty times in tonnage,
and was better maintained(Polmar, 1974, p.55).
Despite the increased tonnage capacity available for
domestic and foreign waterborne trade immediately following
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World War II, most of the navigable ports in the Soviet Union
and virtually all of the nation's major shipbuilding facilities
were destroyed during the war. Shipyards in Odessa, Riga,
Novorossisk, Tuapse, and other port cities had been leveled
(Bock, 1981, p.43). As a consequence, a considerable portion
of the country's limited surviving industrial resources were
al located to capital reconstruction of ports and shipyards.
Even when port restoration and repair ;mprovements were well
on their way to completion, Stalin devoted much of their
capacity in the late 1940's and early 1950 ls to warship con-
struction. The Soviet Union therefore turned to Poland, East
Germany, and other Communist bloc nations to supply the
merchant tonnage needed to carry Russia's expanding foreign
trade(Fairhall, 1971, p.81). The production of merchant ships
from these sources, however, did not totally satisfy the USSR's
requirements for new tonnage.
In the early 1950's, Soviet merchant shipbuilding began
to accelerate. Several factors were responsible. First, in the
1950 's the Soviet Union was facing economic pressures which
would have made a larger merchant marine desirable to any
nation, let alone one as politically isolated and suspicious
as that of Moscow. A more relaxed foreign policy following the
death of Josef Stalin in 1953 served to stimulate the growing
volume of overseas trade and consequently an increased demand
for adequate water transport (Fairhall, 1971, p.64). Secretary
6
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Krushchev wished to employ intensive economic penetration with
traditional political tactics to win allies, particularly in
his dealings with the less developed countries of the Third
World(Thomas, 1976, p.28; Ackley, 1973, p.314). This also neces-
sitated broadening of trade relations with the industrialized
noncommunist states, and entering into more underdeveloped
areas of the world. Both objectives required expansion of
industries producing exportable Soviet-qoods and of Soviet
shipping(Baldwin, et al, 1969, p.73; Ackley, 1973, p.237).
As a direct consequence of the nation's increased commer-
cial activity with overseas trading partners, the proportion
of the USSR's foreign trade carried by its own ships fell from
nearly one-half to less than one-third between 1950 and 1955.
Approximately 88 percent of Soviet exports and inports were
carried by chartered tonnage (Bock, 1981, p.49).Chartering
foreign tonnage produced an uncompensated drain on the
country's limited hard currency reserves, which might other-
wise have been used to finance other badly needed trade or to
acquire specific elements of Western technology urgently
needed by other sectors of the Soviet economy(Fairhal 1, 1971,
p.64). Accordingly, it was during this period that the Soviets
began to concentrate on developing their shipping capacity,
particularly in the higher value general cargo liner trades.
Another significant factor influencing the rapid buildup
of the Soviet merchant fleet was the establishment of the
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Ministry of the Maritime Fleet in 1954, and the appointment of
Viktor Bakayev as its first head. Before Krushchev, neither
Tsarist nor Soviet leaders pursued a long range policy of
maritime development. In 1950, the Soviet Union's merchant
marine ranked only 21st among the maritime fleets of the
world(Baldwin, et a l , 1969, p.73). Under Bakayev's dynamic
leadership, the merchant navy's growth accelerated at a scale
unprecedented in Russia's history. Bakayev explained the
motives for his fleet's buildup in this way:
"It is not a matter of prestige. It allows
our external trade to abandon political and
economic dependence on the capitalist fleet
and increases the efficiency of the trade. Even
pre-revolutionary Russia, having an immeasur-
ably smaller volume of external trade, paid out
150 million roubles a year to foreign shipown-
ers. Now the country is freed from this tribute."
(extracted from Fairhall, 1971, p.80).
Later developments in the transportation sector help
substantiate that the modified bureaucratic structure of Soviet
maritime management positively influenced the growth of the
merchant marine. By divorcing the merchant marine from the land
transportation ministry. waterborne transport soon emerged as
the Soviet Union's principal means of cargo transport.
Of all the USSR's forms of transportation, the rate of
growth of the ocean shipping transportation sector grew the
fastest. The rate of investment in railroad construction and
8
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inland shipping dropped relative to the increased rate of
investment in ocean shipping(Bock, 1981, p.46), this despite
the fact that the Soviet Union has the largest inland water-
ways system in the world.
Although by 1957 the Soviet Union had roughly doubled its
pre-war commercial tonnage, the fleet was still mainly composed
of slow, aging vessels averaging more than twenty-five years
old. With 250 deep sea freighters and ~-total tonnage of only
1.4 million dwt, the average Soviet merchantman was small by
way of comparison to the average vessel size of other maritime
powers, a characteristic that holds true today. In addition,
only seven percent of these ships were capable of speeds in
excess of fourteen knots(Fairhall, 1971, p.65). To operate such
a fleet in a highly competitive world shipping market probably
cost the Soviet Union a great deal. There appear to be several
reasons for this behavior.
The smaller size of Soviet merchant ships seems to defy
the economic rationality of modern ship construction. Normally,
it is more economi cally effi ci ent to operate a commerci al ves-
sel of large size and carrying capacity, than it is to operate
a large number of smaller vessels. It requires less in aggregate
fuel, labor, insurance, port fees, and maintenance costs to send
one 300,000 dwt VLCC on a round trip voyage, for instance, than
it would be to send ten smaller 30,000 dwt vessels on the same
t rip.
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•An analysis of the smaller size characteristic of Soviet
merchant ships can be explained in several ways. First, is the
large number of relatively shallow harbors and narrow straits
in the USSR where smaller Soviet ships are ideally suited to
participate in commercial activity. The Soviet Union has very
extensive coastlines and nearly 2.5 million kilometers of
inland waterways and canals. Many of the Soviet Union's ports
and those of its CEMA/COMECON trading ~~rtners are not very
deep nor well equipped, thus enabling smaller sized ships with
shallower drafts to manuever more safely(Heine and Coe, 1967,
p.11). The flexibility provided by smaller ships is therefore
better suited to accomodate operations in these areas.
In addition to providing increased tonnage for the USSR's
enormous domestic transportation infrastructure, the smaller
vessels employed in commercial activity allow Soviet ships to
make calls at the generally smaller and underdeveloped ports
of the Third World. This continuation of Krushchev's political
purposes is further strengthened by the observation that
although many Soviet ports can handle larger ships, the Soviets
continue to build large numbers of small ships today(Ackley,
1973, p.243; Martin, 1975, p.29). Norman Polmar suggests that
these ships will increase in political importance in the years
ahead:
"As the underdeveloped nations of the Third
World improve their economic position and
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become sources of revenue and raw materials,
Soviet trade with them will probably be
carried exclusively in Soviet bottoms."
(Polmar, 1974, p.79)
The Sixth Five Year Plan called for construction of nearly
1.6 million dwt in domestic and Bloc country shipyards during
1956 to 1960(Shadrin, 1972, p.291). Another measure taken by
the Soviet Union to stimulate the growth of its merchant marine
and participation in the carriage of foreign trade was the
limitation of all transportation of goods between Soviet ports
to ships of the Soviet flag(Butler, et al, 1970, p.392). Addi-
tionally, the use of flags of convenience was prohibited
(Martin, 1975, p.32). Although the Sixth Five Year Plan was
never completed, it did serve to set in motion important
measures which provided the impetus for the later expansion
of the Merchant Marine. By establishing a strong positive
momentum, the 1959-1965 Seven Year Plan, which superceded the
abbreviated Sixth Five Year Plan, was in a much better posture
to achieve the accelerated development of the merchant navy
which followed. During the first three years of the Sixth Five
Year Plan, considerable funds were allocated and spent for the
construction of new vessels at home and abroad, and more
shipbuilding capacity was allocated and utilized for merchant
ship construction(Shadrin, 1972, p.292).
During the period of the Seven Year Plan from 1959 to 1965
inclusive, the merchant fleet grew at a dramatic pace. The
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programmed growth of the merchant marine was modified twice
during the seven year timeframe, increasing the targeted growth
rate both times(Shadrin, 1972, p.293). The second increase was
in 1963, because the construction target was achieved two
years in advance. The revised growth target was completed
ahead of schedule again in 1965, an unprecedented achievement
in Soviet planning practice(Shadrin, 1972, p.293). In large
part, this was because of the increas~~n Soviet foreign trade
that exceeded the cargo carrying capacity of the Soviet
merchant marine(Ackley, 1973, p.237). In 1958, the physical
volume of the USSR's foreign trade exceeded the 1950 volume
by 130 percent. Seaborne trade increased even more rapidly,
expanding by 220 percent during these years. The merchant
marine accounted for 38 percent of Soviet foreign trade
tonnage in 1958 as compared with 27 percent in 1950(see Table
I ). The Soviet government was bound to respond. The inter-
esting point here is not the decision in principle, but rather
the scale and persistent vigor with which the USSR has pursued
the development of its merchant fleet since the early 1950's.
As Krushchev increased trade with the less developed
countries of Africa, Asia, and to a lesser extent Latin America,
the commodity composition of Soviet foreign commerce shifted to
petroleum and other bulk cargoes. Exports made up only 44
percent of Soviet foreign trade tonnage in 1950, but by 1958
this share had increased to nearly 85 percent(Athay, 1973, p.
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Table I
Soviet Foreign Trade, Total and Seaborne,
Selected Yea r s 1950-70
(millions of tons)
Total Seaborne Percent Carried ; n Percent ; n
Trade Trade Seaborne Soviet Ships Soviet Ships
1950 30.2 8.3 27 5.9 72
1958 69.6 26.6 38 14.6 55
1959 85.6 34.8 41 16.4 47
1960 99.3 44.3 45 18.2 41
1962 132.9 66.9 50 24.8 37
1965 173.9 91. 8 53 46.4 50
1967 206.7 108.8 53 56.6 52
1968 217.8 111. 9 51
1970 246.3 121. 3 49 67.9 56
(data extracted from Athay, 1973, p.95)
p.94). The merchant marine's increasing role in foreign trade
was further highl ighted in 1956 when, for the first time, the
ton-mile performance of the fleet in foreign commerce exceeded
that in coastal trade(Carr, 1976, p.334). This milestone was
particularly significant in view of the highly developed system
of inland water transportation previously described. The domes-
tic activities of the Soviet merchant marine, in which it
enjoys a complete monopoly, consist largely of bulk cargo
movements in the Black Sea, Caspian, and Far Eastern basins
and the servicing ports along the Northern sea route, many of
which have very limited road or rail access(Carr, 1976, p.335;
Athay, 1973, p.65).
Stimulated by this unprecedented expansion of Soviet sea-
borne foreign trade, the merchant navy achieved its most
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spectacular growth from 1962 to 1966. Increases in oil exports,
which accounted for nearly half of the country·s total trade,
caused seaborne trade to expand at annual rates greater than
28 percent for three years in a row during 1959 to 1961. The
intensive program of ship acquisitions that followed reached
its zenith in 1964, when 1.3 million deadweight tons were added
to the fleet. Fleet capacity more than doubled during this
period, increasing from 4.2 million to~ in early 1962 to
approximately 8.9 million tons by the end of 1966(Carr, 1976,
p.331).
As a consequence, the Soviet merchant marine jumped from
12th place in world s t a ndi nqs in 1958 to 6th place in 1965,
becoming one of the youngest fleets in the world with almost
80 percent of its ships built in the previous 10 years. It
also allowed the USSR to appear with greater frequency in the
crosstrades and more lucrative charter markets. The Seven Year
Plan permitted the last of the country's coal burning commer-
cial carriers to retire, along with a significant number of
the vessels used in domestic waterborne transportation. The
average age of a ship in the Soviet merchant marine decreased
from 14 years to 8 years old, while the average speed increas-
ed from 8 to 14.5 knots(Athay, 1973, pp.289-294; Shadrin, 1972,
p.294). Also, profits from shipping were 10 times higher in
1965 t han i n 1958 ( B0 ck, 1981, p , 49 ) •
Although the size of the merchant fleet fell slightly short
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of planned growth between 1966 and 1970, nonetheless the addi-
tion of 340 new vessels and 4.5 million dwt constituted a 42
percent increase in total fleet size over the five year period
(Shadrin, 1972, p.295). The 1966 to 1970 growth of the merchant
marine enabled the Soviet Union to consolidate its newly won
posture as one of the world's leading maritime powers, and
permitted Soviet penetration into trades that were previously
the exclusive domain of the Western li~er conferences. Compared
to 1966 there was an increase of 157.8 percent in cargo carried
by liners and a 188.7 percent increase in international trade
(Bock, 1981, p.49). Many of the new ships were engaged largely
in crosstrading, also referred to as third flag carriage. Low
shipping rates were used to attract cargoes for transport
between foreign ports. The event that triggered Soviet penetra-
tion into the U.S. liner trades was the signing of the US-USSR
Maritime Agreement in 1972. Soviet practices in this regard
will be developed in greater detail later in this paper. Table
II below shows the USSR's inventory of merchant vessels at the
end of the Eighth Five Year Plan according to the Soviet
shipping journal, Morskoy Flot.
At the end of this period, a substantial portion of the
Soviet Union's older merchant vessels had been retired.
Better than 70 percent of the ships under the Soviet flag were
capable of speeds in excess of 13 knots. In addition, the
average dwt tonnage of a Soviet merchant vessel had more than
15
doubled since 1955. By 1970, nearly 50 Soviet ports were com-
pletely mechanized permitting the handling of containerized
cargo(Bock, 1981, pp.49-50).
Tab1e I I
Composition of the
Soviet Merchant Marine
as of January 1 , 1971
Steamers Mot 0""- Ship s Tot a 1
Ship Type Number GRT Number GRT Number GRT
Passenger &
Multipurpose 11 79859 192 405743 203 485602
Dry Cargo 230 11 42869 1589 6001704 1819 7144573
Tanker 37 960506 388 24281 46 425 3388652
Auxiliary 213 107018 485 226503 698 333521
Fishing 194 287485 2694 2975766 2888 3263251
Research 62 75892 267 211857 329 2877 49
Other 8 34456 242 277603 250 312059
755 2688085 5857 12527322 6612 15215407
(data extracted from Bock, 1981, p. 49)
The crucial element in the Ninth Five Year Plan was the
introduction of containerized and other specialized ships. The
1971 to 1975 plan witnessed the addition of 3.3 million tons to
the fleet. The largest amount of new construction was in tanker
tonnage, substantially increasing the merchant marine's carrying
capacity for petroleum products.
More advanced vessels, such as RojRo ships, container
16
vessels and barge carriers, were also added to the fleet as
the older general purpose dry cargo vessels were scrapped. The
soviets developed the use of fully cellular container ships
very slowly, and in 1980 only had 26 such vessels. The ten
ships in the 729-TEU(twenty-foot equivalent units) KHUDOZHNIK
SARYAN class may be among the last since the Soviets apparently
favor the more flexible Ro/Ro vessels, which they feel afford
greater protection from market shifts and politically inspired
trade barriers(Bock, 1981, pp.53-54). Fully cellular container
ships are greatly dependent upon suitable cargo handling
facilities, normally only available in the well developed ports
of the industrialized Western nations. In contrast, Ro/Ro ves-
sels are much more versatile and can be shifted to operations
in alternate trade routes with relative ease.
In 1975, the Soviet union placed into service the SKULPTOR
KONENKOV, a prototype for six Polish-built Ro/Ro ships with a
60-ton capacity stern ramp(CNO, 1981, p.62). The Soviets have
also begun operating barge carriers based on the U.S. LASH and
SEABEE designs. The Soviet vessels are considered to be the
technological equivalent of Western intermodal vessels.
Fairplay Shipping Weekly, for example, recently reported that
the world's first nuclear powered LASH ship, ALEKSEY KOSYGIN,
was nearing completion. The 39,900 dwt, 264.5 meter vessel will
be used in the demanding North Sea route between the White Sea
and the Bering Strait(Fairplay, February, 1983, p.15). Fairplay
17
"SOVIET VESSELS
IN THE U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC TRADE
Pictured below are two Baltatlantic Line Ro/Ro vessels unloading at Port
Elizabeth, N.J. The KOMSOMOLSK class (left) and KHUDOZHNIK class (right)
compare favorably with modern U.S. vessels in size, speed and flexibility.
For purposes of comparison, these ships are competitive with the most recent
type American flag ships, the Ro/Ro s.S. MAINE (operated by States Marine
Line) and containership PRESIDENT MONROE (operated by APL), respectively.
Photo: courtesy Sea-Land
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SOVIET VESSELS IN THE U.S. /MID EAST TRADE
-~-~
Pictured above is the M.V. MAGNITOGORSK p one of the
newer Ro/Ro vessels in the Soviet liner fleet. Built
in 1975, the MAGNITOGORSK was placed immediately into
U.S. cross trade in the North Atlantic. The ship is
capable of carrying 1,368 TEU' s •
17 b
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has also noted the recent opening of a Soviet Northern Sea
route with service to Murmansk, Zelenyy Mys, Igarka, and the
yinisey River(Wade, 1983, p.21). Much of the new bulk and liner
tonnage ordered under the current five year plan is expected to
be employed along this trade route, which will probably be dom-
inated by the Soviets who operate the largest ice-strengthened
fleet in the world.
The 1975 to 1980 Five Year Plan saw dry cargo transport
capacity increase from 9.6 million dwt in 1975 to 11.2 million
dwt in 1980(Bock, 1981, p.57). While tonnage in conventional
general cargo ships dropped slightly, construction of new
intermodal carriers matched the retirement rate of the older
break bulk vessels. The greatest increases were realized in
bulk carrier and timber carrier tonnage during this period.
Of particular note in the composition of the Soviet
union's merchant navy is its continuing emphasis on the modern-
ization of its ocean carriers. By closely following the West
in the design, construction and employment of modularized
cargoes, the Soviets promise to become increasingly competitive
along the established trade routes.
ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF
THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE TODAY
Coordination and overall responsibility for the maritime
activities pursued by the soviet Union rest with the Council
18
of Ministers, operating within the framework of the formal
series of Five Year Plans. Under this Council, the merchant
fleet has been under the operational management of the
Ministry of the Merchant Marine since 1954.
The following description of the organizational structure
and management of the USSR's merchant fleet is taken in large
part from material prepared for Congress by the Office of
International Activities of the u.S. Meritime Administration.
The organization of the Soviet merchant marine embodies
varying degrees of centralization and independence. The
Ministry of the Merchant Marine, or Morflot, located in Moscow,
is responsible for the promotion of national maritime transport
under the provisions of the Merchant Marine Code of the USSR of
1968 and other laws. Within its responsibilities the Ministry
provides for the implementation of the five year plans for all
branches of the Soviet shipping industry. The Ministry approves
investments in ports and other facilities, works out promotion-
al long term programs, coordinates technological developments,
and controls the implementation of international conventions
and agreements. Division of powers in a functional sense in
this regard is not always clear cut nor, it seems, observed.
Below the Ministry level in the organizational structure come
the three state holding corporations, each based at the Ministry
in Moscow. These corporations are charged with the responsibili-
ty of coordinating the activities of all the shipping companies
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in a given geographic area. The three holding companies are
Yuzhflot, the South Shipping State Corporation; Sevzapflot,
the Nort-West State Shipping corporation; and, Dalflot, the
Far East State Shipping Corporation. The state corporations
are structured into divisions, such as the Shipping and Con-
tainer Lines Office, the Tramp Office, Tanker Office, Passen-
ger Office, and Port operations Office.
Because of the geographical division characterizing these
state corporations, their spheres of responsibility are diverse.
For example, Yuzhflot, which has seven shipping companies un-
der its jurisdiction, deals with the interests of the substan-
tial Black Sea Shipping Company, with its large, dry cargo
fleet~ and those of the smaller Middle Asia Shipping Company,
which principally carries out river trade operations into
Afghanistan. It also has under its umbrella the Novorossiisk
Shipping Company, a tanker operation. Yuzhflot tonnage accounts
for more than 50 percent of the entire Soviet fleet.
One of the most crucial areas of involvement for the three
state holding corporations concerns acquisition of new tonnage
by the individual companies. How the total amount of money to be
spent on new construction and how it is to be distributed
between the holding corporations and ultimately the companies,
evolves from a series of meetings involving the Ministry of the
Merchant Marine and the corporations, and the presidents of the
individual companies. Allocations of the tonnage are calculated
20
according to the needs of the area, and not to its historical
profitability. New building schemes originate with the compan-
ies and are passed to the holding corporations. These are then
passed to Morflot's technical board and finally to the main
board of the Ministry.
Where a particular type of tonnage primarily benefits
other ministries, i.e., Soviet Arctic shipping and the corres-
ponding oil and gas ministries, then a-contribution toward
construction and operation may come from another ministry's
budget. Coordination of this budgetary process is handled by
Gosplan, the state planning agency.
other means of acquiring tonnage include use of certain
development funds that are accrued under limitations specified
in the five year plan", and the "bareboat charter" technique
employed by Sovfracht, the USSR's chartering agency. While the
former method is rarely used, the latter has been employed
frequently. Under the bareboat charter technique, Sovfracht
starts off with an agreement to take the vessel on charter for
an agreed period with transfer of ownership at the end. In
other words, a lease with option to buy. The vessel, therefore,
may be paid for out of its earnings without the involvement of
Government funds. The first ships secured under this type of
arrangement were bareboated in 1973, and now over 30 vessels
have been secured in this manner.
Each of the 18 Soviet shipping companies under the network
21
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of the three state holding corporations basically serves the
needs of the geographical area in which it is located and has
some degree of autonomy. Some companies are responsible as well
for the operation of ports. Thus, in addition to running its
own diverse and substantial fleet, the Baltic Shipping Company,
for example, operates the ports of Leningrad, Kalingrad, and
others, and also runs ship repair yards including floating
docks. In addition, the company operate~ a rest home for sea-
men and a maritime school for able seamen and deck hands. This
contrasts sharply with practice in the United States, where it
is indeed unusual to see shipowners make policy agreements for
terminal sharing, much less repair use and seamen1s training.
Other major organizations under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of the Merchant Marine include Sovfracht, the tramp
chartering agency; Morpasflot, the general agency for passen-
ger vessels; Sovsudopodyom, which performs off-shore and deep
sea salvage operations; and, Sovinflot, described briefly
below. All are located in Moscow.
The general shipping agent for Soviet shipowners is
Sovinflot, which was set up as a separate organization in 1969.
It provides services such as agency, stevedoring, and bunkers
to Soviet shipping lines. In liner shipping it coordinates the
activities of Soviet shipping companies and may act on their
own behalf within liner conferences and pools. Sovinflot also
takes care of long term booking arrangements, rents and leases
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containers, arranges services in container trades, and super-
vises and coordinates the maritime segment of the Trans-Siberian
Container Line. Sovinflot acts at the request of Soviet shipown-
ers in the handling of arbitration and court cases.
The complexity and ambiguities of the management structure
under which the merchant fleet is operated results in consider-
able administrative and policymaking overlap. The relationship
between the Ministry of the Merchant Ma~ine and the other
agencies it works with in the administration of maritime affairs
has resulted in recurring problems. The merchant marine inter-
acts with other sectors of the Soviet economy, and assists in
the pursuit of domestic and foreign policy objectives that are
sometimes at odds with commercial goals.
In the context of Soviet maritime expansion, the European
satellite states of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance
(COMECON or CEMA) must be counted among the resources available
to Soviet planners. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, (East)
German Democratic Republic, Romania, Cuba, and even Vietnam
integrate their maritime activities with those of the Soviet
Union by pooling shipping services, planned division of labor
and construction, and other practices. Joint CEMA operations
have been expanded every year since 1958(Harbron, 1962, p.25;
Baldwin, et al, 1969, p.79). Using a central computer center
located in Moscow, a Morflot freight coordination office en-
sures the optimum use of Soviet bloc cargo carriers(Baldwin,
23
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This illustration from Fortune magazine depicts the USSR's network of
agencies.
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eta 1, 1 969, p, 79; B0 ck, 1 981, p, 48 ). Sin ceve sse 1sop era ted
by these nations are state controlled carriers, the growth of
the CEMA shipbuilding bloc presents a potentially significant
trade coalition capable of pronounced economic influence.
Under the guiding and dominant leadership of the Soviet Union,
the utilization of merchant ships, in particular, lends itself
well to synergistic benefits from centralized management and
control.
Cooperation in shipbuilding construction with member
states of the CEMA is conducted via the Shipbuilding Section
of the Permanent Commission on the Machine-Building Industry.
Through this organization, specialization in the construction
of various ship types or marine equipment is determined, along
with coordination among the member states on the use of re-
search facilities to avoid duplication of effort.
Although the Soviet Union presently has 18 large shipyards,
each employing upwards of 2,000 workers on a full time basis, a
considerable amount of merchant and naval tonnage is purchased
from foreign yards. Passenger ships, for example, are built
exclusively in the (East) German Democratic Republic, while
bulk carriers are a specialty of Poland's shipyards. Finland
has traditionally provided timber carriers to the Soviet Union.
More recently, it delivered two YULIUS FUCHIK class SEABEE
vessels to the Soviet Union(CNO, 1981, p.65). In addition, the
CEMA promotes the standardization of marine equipment, inter-
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changeability of machine parts, intra-CEMA trade in marine
engineering products, and aids in ship repairs within the CEMA
reg ion ( B0 c k , 1981, p• 48). As are s u1t , con t r 0 1 ism 0 r e c los ely
maintained by Moscow and competition between the member nations
is reduced. That this system produces substantial economic
benefits in the aggregate is seriously questioned by this
writer. In practice, the Soviet system appears to have virtual-
ly eliminated innovation in the shipblfTlding industry and
significantly discouraged incentive. The time delay that is
evident between the introduction of successful technologically
advanced vessels by the West, and the subsequent introduction
of similar vessels under the Soviet flag tends to corroberate
the assertion that innovation within the CEMA system is an
inordinately slow process.
Another body dealing with ocean shipping is the Permanent
Working Group on Shipping under CEMAls Permanent Commission on
Transport. By this vehicle, the USSR divides up free tonnage
among member countries, decides on coordinated action in chart-
ering and liner services, and establishes tarriff policy(Fair-
hall, 1971, p.110). A special bureau in CEMA coordinates
activities among freight forwarders and the shipping lines,
and arranges for temporary help with additional tonnage when
ne ce s sa ry ( B0 c k , 1981, p , 48) •
The Soviet merchant marine is presently operating on over
70 different international trade routes, calling at over 125
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countries throughout the world. Prior to the boycott by U.S.
longshoremen in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
Soviet merchant ships were calling at nearly 60 different ports
in the United States(CNO. 1981. p.61). While the Soviet percent-
age share of the world shipping market has remained relatively
constant over the past decade. the result of a world shipbuild-
ing boom. its multipurpose general cargo capacity has grown
substantially.
The Soviet Union occupies 7th place in tonnage and 2nd
place in terms of numbers in world shipping standings. Tables
III and IV display the relative sizes of the world's major
merchant fleets as of January 1. 1981.
Table V shows that by the end of 1980 the transport fleet
of the CEMA member countries had a total deadweight tonnage of
about 31 million tons and a gross registered tonnage of 21.3
million tons. respectively. The latter totalled 61.3 percent
of the deadweight tonnage of all the fleets of the CEMA member
countries and 62.4 percent of their register tonnage. In com-
parison with the preceding year, the deadweight tonnage of the
transport fleets of all CEMA member countries increased by 1.6
percent, while that of the USSR's merchant marine increased by
0.5 percent(Morskoy Flat, No.1, 1981). The summary only includes
data on the maritime transport fleets and includes ships of a
gross registered tonnage of 100 tons and more (excluding trans-
port ships serving the fishing industry and passenger ships),
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Greece
USSR
Panama
Liberia
"
Japan
:~
United Kingdom
China(PRC)
Ita 1y
Singapore
Norway
United States
Spain
, West Germany
;i
.' Netherlands
Cyprus
Table III
Major Merchant Fleets of the World
January 1. 1981
(Number of Ships)
l- I
"j 2530
l- 12437
l 2271
l- I 1762
I 1056
I 695
l- I 622 .
l- I 622
I 616
I 578
I 509
l- I 473
1 444
l- I 395
2928
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
MARAD 1981 Annual Report
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Table IV
Major Merchant Fleets of the World
January 1, 1981
(Tonnage in Thousands)
12,23.5
I-------~ 42,302
62,001
38,001
38,.57.5
69,.5.59
10,129
9,221
1.53,)42
i------l 21,7.57
21,103
1------'
Liberia
Greece
Japan
United Kingdom
~ Norway
Panama
USSR
United States
France
Italy
Spain
West Germany
Singapore
China(PRC)
India
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
MARAD 1981 Annual Report
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Table V
Cargo Transport Fleets of the
USSR and Other CEMA Member Countries
January 1, 1981
ountrles
DWT Number GRT DWT
Total cargo fleet- 2648 21267091 31033954 1709 13348515 18978333
Combined vessels
for bulk dry and
liquid cargo- 13 679 953 11-,1 329 10 6251 43 1085952
Tanker fleet- 377
including:
LNG carriers- 10
Chemical carriers- 7
5808896 9209132 319
160962 173385 10
31831 44428
14778242206534931380 8359004 11223604
4364368 6668777
160962 173385
335766
347653
53693
73200
1834496
159118
1128481
172941
331477
278322
98547
72764
106
32
37
45
20
2
6790495
259921
716899
379308
91714
73200
254815
632628
299839
164130
72764
4318205
54
90
52
33
2
320
2258Dry cargo fleet-
including:
Bulk carriers-
Refrigerated
vessels-
Container
carriers-
RojRo ships-
Ocean ferries-
LASH carriers-
Source:Morskoy Flot, No.1, 1981.
and therefore may differ slightly from the totals provided in
Tables III and IV.
According to the data of Lloyd's Register, the total gross
registered tonnage of the world merchant fleet as of mid-1980 was
419.9 million tons(Morskoy Flot, No.5, 1981), 28.7 million tons of
which pertained to ships not participating in commercial shipping.
Thus the gross registered tonnage of the merchant cargo fleets
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of the CEMA member countries comprised about 7.9 percent of
the world merchant fleet engaged in merchant shipping (391.2
million registered tons), while that of the Soviet fleet
compri sed 3.4 percent and was unchanged from that of the
previous year.
Table VI
Deadweight Tonnage of the ~rchant Fleets
of the CEMA Member Countries
in the Period 1975-1980 (thousands of tons)
1975 1980 DWT % Growth
Country
" Dry I I Dry I Share SinceTotal Cargo Tanker Total Cargo Tanker -CEMA 1975
Bulgaria 1163 717 446 1557 1050 507 5.0 33.9
Hungary 72 72 111 111 O. 4 54.2
8i
Vietnam 270 228 42 0.9 100.0
GDR 1793 1186 607 1877 1460 417 6.0 4. 7
. < Cuba 558 495 63 953 861 92 3.1 70.8f
Poland 3876 2864 1012 4379 3398 981 14. 1 13.0
Romania 1213 770 442 2663 2076 587 8.6 119.5
US SR 14997 9693 5304 18978 11224 7754 61.1 26.5
Czech'ia 224 224 245 245 0.8 9. 4
Source: Morskoy F1ot , No.1, 1982.
From 1975 to 1980 (see Table VI, above), the deadweight
tonnage of the cargo transport fleets of the CEMA member countries
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increased by 7.1 million tons or by 29.8 percent.
According to the data of the USSR Register (Morskoy Flot,
No.4, 1981), the gross registered tonnage of all Soviet mari-
time vessels of 100 tons or more was 22,326,000 tons as of
January 1, 1981. Consequently, the gross registered tonnage of
the cargo transport fleet was 59.8 percent of the gross
registered tonnage of the overall Soviet maritime fleet.
The statistical summary of the CE~A Bureau for Coordina-
ting Ship Chartering appears regularly in various Soviet
shipping journals and gives detailed data on the composition
of the fleet of each shipping company of the CEMA member
countries. In the Soviet Union, the Novorossiysk Shipping
Company is the largest owner of ships for shipping bulk cargo.
The total deadweight tonnage of her tankers is about 4.3 mil-
lion tons, and of her ten major bulk carriers, about 1.1 mil-
lion tons. The fleet of the Black Sea shipping Company consists
of 246 dry-cargo ships totalling 3.6 million dwt and two ships
for transporting liquified natural gas(LNG). Occupying third
place in size of fleet is the Far East Shipping Company(FESCO)
with 231 ships and deadweight tonnage exceeding 1.8 million
tons. The Baltic Fleet, meanwhile, has fourth place with 170
ships at 1.6 million deadweight tons(Morskoy Flot, No.1, 1982).
The information published in the Soviet press on the volume
of shipments and freight turnover of the merchant marine of the
Soviet Union in comparison with the cargo shipments by the other
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world shipping nations, makes it possible to point out several
comparisons regarding the role of the Soviet Union in interna-
ti onal shi ppi ng.
In 1979, the world fleet as a whole transported 3,778
million tons of various types of cargo compared with 2,605
million tons in 1970. That is, the volume of world maritime
shipping increased by 1,173 million tons, or by 45 percent.
During this same period, the Soviet fi~et increased its volume
of s hip men t s f r om 162 t 0 227mill ion ton s , 0 r 40 per ce nt . The
freight turnover of the world's merchant navies for the period
1970 to 1979 increased by 7,021 billion ton-miles or by
approximately 66 percent, while that of the Soviet Union's
merchant marine increased by 29.7 percent(Morskoy Flot, No.1,
1982). Consequently, Soviet shipping companies delivered
freight to relatively shorter distances than was done by ships
operating under the flags of other countries. This is related
to the fact that a considerable portion of Soviet freight was
comprised of goods transported within the country. The Soviet
merchant fleet carried out a substantial amount of domestic
trade and shipment of export-import commodities in trade with
Communist bloc countries.
As indicated by Table VII, the volume of goods transported
by the Soviet merchant marine in foreign operations in the past
Five Year Plan amounted on the average to approximately 65
percent of all cargo transported by the Soviet fleet. The freight
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Table VII
Participation of Soviet Fleet
in International Maritime Traffic
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980
Freight go ods
transported
(World) m.tons 2605 3355 3468 3470 3778
Freight goods
transported
(USSR) m.tons 162 215 219 227 227 228
USS R foreign
trade of this
total m.tons 90 134 142 147 148 154
Freight turn-
over (Worl d)
billion ton-miles 10654 17053 17517 17034 17675 16710
USSR turnover
billion ton-miles 354. 1 411.3 416.9 446.6 459.3 450.6
Foreign trade of
this tot a 1 329. 1 378.0 383. 4 410. 4 422.0
DWT of world
~ fl e et 326.1 601.2 641.3 662.8 673.7 682.8
DWT of Soviet
fleet 12.0 16.0 17. 1 18. 4 18.8 19.0
Source:Morskoy Flot, No.1. 1982
turnover of the Soviet fleet in foreign operations amounted to
approximately 92 percent of the total freight turnover of the
merchant marine. The Soviet F1eet 1s share of foreign traffic in
international shipping increased s1ightly from 4.0 to 4.2
percent in volume of freight shipments, and 2.2 to 2.4 percent
.
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~
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~in percentage of the world's freight turnover. The share of
participation of the Soviet merchant marine in the delivery
of foreign trade goods amounted to 48 percent of the total
traffic in these goods.
SOVIET MARITIME OBJECTIVES
The foregoing facts and figures a~e strong testimony to
the economic and political importance of the roles played by
the Soviet merchant marine since the Second World War. Although
historically and geographically the USSR has been a land power.
its government has allocated substantial resources for an
impressive increase in merchant tonnage. According to Admiral
of the Soviet Navy Sergei Gorshkov. renowned as the Alfred
Thayer Mahan of Soviet seapower.
"the goal of Soviet seapower is to effectively
utilize the world ocean in the interest of
building communism ••• An important integral
part of seapower is the equipment and person-
nel which make possible the practical utiliza-
tion of the oceans and seas as transport
routes connecting continents. countries. and
peoples. For this it is essential to have a
merchant marine. a network of ports and ser-
vices supporting its operation. and a devel-
oped shipbuilding and ship repair industry."
(Gorshkov, 1976. p.41).
Within the context of maritime power and foreign policy,
the following basic maritime goals of the merchant marine appear
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evident:
(1) To provide shipping capacity to meet the USSR's
domestic and external shipping requirements in order to reduce
dependence on foreign shipping.The primary purpose of the
Soviet merchant marine is to carry Soviet cargo(Carr, 1976, p.
334). Despite the increasing utilization of Soviet ships in
crosstrading, the chief mission of the USSR's large and growing
merchant fleet is to achieve economic-~elf sufficiency, a
characteristic goal of Russia since the time of the Tsars.
The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 further highlighted the
strategic and commercial imperatives for a stronger merchant
marine that could free the Soviet Union from dependence on
Western shipping(Heine, 1973, p.267).
Politically, the Soviets would consider it desirable to
carryall of its own cargo, and as much of other nations' cargo
as possible, in Soviet bottoms. And economically, if the former
objective is not possible, it is desirable to make a profit in
convertible hard currency through revenues earned from avail-
able shipping assets(Ackley, 1976, p.31). Both the economic and
political aspects of this issue are recognized and are being
aggressively dealt with by the Soviet Union. According to
Timofei Guzhenko, Minister of the Merchant Fleet of the USSR,
the rapid development of the USSR's economy, the expansion of
its foreign commerce, and its economic agreements required a
considerable increase in the merchant marine to achieve these
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objectives(Heine, 1973, p.268). The ultimate aim is to not
only carry most of the Soviet Union's foreign and domestic
commerce, but also to compete for the carriage of cargoes from
one foreign port to another(Heine, 1973, p.268), in other
words, crosstrading.
This objective was, in effect, confirmed by S. Makhailov
writing in Voprosy Ekonomiki when he stated,
"The creation of our own merchant fleet made
it possible to guarantee the USSR's indepen-
dence from the world charter market and to
begin the transportation on Soviet ships of
cargo and passengers of other countries."
(extracted in part from Ackley, 1974, p.239)
The USSR looks hopefully to its merchant marine as a means
of conserving and earning foreign exchange by carrying its own
import and export cargoes in Soviet ships to the maximum extent
possible. For example, Russian commentators on maritime affairs
point out that when Soviet ships began carrying wool from
Australia, the USSR was able to conserve $1 million annually
which it had previously paid to foreign shipping companies
(Heine, 1973, p.268).
Although the Soviet Union could have stressed the expan-
sion of her traditional railroad transportation system, signi-
ficant disadvantages appeared. Most of the nations with whom
the Soviets conducted the preponderence of their foreign trade
(i.e. CEMA countries), were able to transport cargo approx-
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imately 30 percent less expensively by ship than by overland
rail (Fairhall, 1971, p.60).
Soviet flag ships currently transport more than 60 percent
of the country's overseas trade. In so doing, the merchant
fleet affords significant advantages. Soviet cargoes are not
subject to foreign scrutiny nor do the Soviets lose foreign
exchange for transporting their imports, with the exception of
u.S. grain and other cargoes for whicrr~bilateral pooling agree-
ments have been signed. Approximately 80 percent of the Soviet
Union1s foreign trade cargoes carried in its own ships are
exports. Oil is by far the USSRls major export commodity
accounting for nearly half of all seaborne Soviet foreign trade
( Nit ze , eta 1, 1979, Pp, 1 48 - 1 49 ). The s elf s uf f i c i e ncy pro vide d
by a strong merchant marine permits a degree of economic and
political flexibility absent when foreign flag shipping must
be relied upon to provide minimum transportation needs.
(2) To earn foreign currency, particularly convertible
"hard" currencies, to assist in the national balance of
payments. The need to maximize hard currency earnings from the
merchant marine cannot be overemphasized. With their substan-
tial import requirements for badly needed grain, technology
and capital goods from the West, the Soviets are hard pressed
to finance their increasing international trade activities.
Soviet efforts to partially offset food shortages, for
instance, through continued massive imports have led to record
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purchases of grains, meats, wheat flour, butter, and other
products. Rising food purchases, which negatively affect the
Soviet Union's balance of payments, have led to record hard
currency outlays, now well over $10 billion per annum. Table
VI II below shows the USSR's growing dependence on imported
foreign grain, which must all be paid for in increasingly
scarce hard currencies,
Table VIII
Soviet Grain Imports
(millions of metric tons;
trade year begins 1 July)
' .
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Source: data extracted from Defense Intelligence Agency report
DDB-1900-21-82
The chronic shortage of hard currency (i.e., dollars, yen,
pounds sterling, francs, Deutsche marks, etc.) is the economic
touchstone of Soviet policy. Consequently, the USSR attempts
to carry as much of its own trade in Soviet ships as possible
in order to limit balance of payment defecits, while transport-
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ing as much non-Soviet cargo as possible in order to earn hard
currency. Maximizing their tonnage of non-Soviet tonnage in
this manner, however, has often led to practices that are not
considered as "fair competition" among U.S. liner companies,
such as rate cutti ng.
To fully grasp the importance of the Soviet merchant
marine1s contribution to the USSR's balance of payments, the
monetary framework of "soft" and "h a r d?" currencies must be
recognized. Only hard currencies that are readily convertible
to other currencies, such as those used in Western Europe,
Japan, and North America, are acceptable for the settlement
of international accounts. The Soviet rouble and the so called
"soft" currencies of the CEMA and many Third World nations are
not convertible. To clear defecits incurred in its trade
accounts with the West, the Soviet Union has been forced to
draw heavily on its scarce gold reserves and other reserve
stocks(Athay, 1973, p.96). Without convertible monies, foreign
trade with the West stops. Soviet economic planners would be
required to expend the time and physical resources necessary
to develop and produce these goods domestically, perhaps at a
much higher opportunity cost. If the USSR is to obtain the
requisite imports necessary to sustain a high rate of economic
growth, then means of earning hard currency revenues must be
aggressively pursued.
As a result of the USSR's expansive shipbuilding program
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during the 1960's, the increased tonnage available for carriage
of seaborne trade in Soviet vessels permitted the USSR to go
from a net negative balance to a net gain in both soft and hard
currency payments by 1965 (shipping activities only). Table IX
below shows the estimated gains and losses to the Soviet
balance of payments generated during the last decade by using
domestic flag ships rather than foreign charters to carry
Soviet trade. Freight revenues earned Tn foreign trade shipping
are shown as gains to the balance of payments. Increased foreign
exchange spending resulting from operating Soviet ships in for-
eign areas (i.e., port dues, canal tolls, pilotage fees, e t c • },
decreased foreign exchange revenues arising from fewer goods and
services sold to foreign flag ships in Soviet ports, and foreign
capital expenses are all included under losses:
Table IX
Net Effect on Balance of Payments in Hard and
Soft Currencies of Using Soviet Rather than Foreign
Ships to Carry a Portion of Soviet Seaborne Foreign
Trade, 1960, 1965, and 1970
(millions of rubles)
Soft Currency Hard Currency
Combined
Year Gains Losses Balance Gains Losses Balance net gain
1960 105.0 124.6 -19.6 47. 2 44.6 2.6 -17.0
1965 300.6 206.0 94.6 161. 8 86.1 75.7 170.3
1970 754.9 463. 4 291. 5 443. 4 157. 1 286.3 577. 8
Source: At hay , 1973, p , 99.
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The high proportion of foreign exchange revenues earned
by Soviet vessels is partially explained by the success of
Soviet efforts to minimize the share of ship operating expenses
paid out in foreign exchange. Russian merchant ship operators
are encouraged to minimize the ratio of rouble expenditures to
foreign exchange income, and the crews are offered fiscal
incentives to do likewise. In turn, the nature of fully
distributed costs and capital deprecia~ion, as we know them.
are significantly different for Soviet merchantmen than for
u.S. operators. Since the Soviets rely on Polish and German
shipyards, as well as their own, capital costs for construc-
tion and major repairs are mainly sustained in soft currency.
Current expenses in ship operating costs are often paid in
ruble accounts. and virtually all marine insurance is covered
by the Soviet agency Ingostrakh. In addition, almost all
exports are transacted c.i.f. and most imports are purchased
f.o.b., further conserving on freight charges. With the choice
of running over on their rouble estimates or earning more hard
currency, the latter choice appears to win out. It is in this
context that many cut rate, sharply competitive Soviet prac-
tices may be better understood. Since the Soviet Union has
experienced difficulties in expanding its commodity exports
to the West, the hard currency earnings of the merchant fleet
have particular importance(Hardt. 1977, p.69; Athay, 1973, pp.
95-101).
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The soviets have consequently employed their merchant
vessels in such a manner as to enable the fleet to earn hard
currencies which the USSR is required to pay for the goods and
services so urgently needed for its economic growth and social
responsibilities. Accordingly, it follows that Soviet ships are
best employed in those commercial activities realizing the
greatest profit. principally, these activities have been in the
crosstrades and, to a lesser extent, 7n winter charters when
the Soviet union's northern and far eastern ports are frozen
over.
The aforementioned economic considerations have been
motivating factors in the planning and development of the
Soviet merchant marine. Economic advantages notwithstanding,
however, from time to time military and political goals have
been pursued with apparent disregard for the profit motive.
The political potential and underlying military capabilities
of this powerful arm of Soviet seapower will be explored more
fully in the following two sections.
(3) To assist in the expansion of Soviet policy through-
out the world, particularly in the Lesser Developed Countries
(LDC's) and Soviet "client" states. Although the nuance of
maritime presence is intrinsic to operations by naval forces
and merchant ships anywhere in the world, the less developed
countries of the Third World seem to provide particularly
fertile grounds for the political and economic aspirations of
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the Soviet Union.
The increasing number of visits by soviet flag ships to
ports in the developing nations of the world is a constantly
recurring theme often repeated by Russian shipping authorities.
Minister Guzhenko has written,
"Maritime vessels serve as an important
means of implementing our Party's successively
conducted principles of peac~~ul coexistence,
lessening of tension, and an equal and mutual-
ly advantageous exchange of trade in interna-
tional matters.
"Implementation of the Program of Peace
approved during the 24th CPSU Congress and
healthier international relations facilitate
in expanding the geography of our commercial
fleets' maritime shipments. Today vessels fly-
ing the Soviet flag can be encountered by all
latitudes of the world's oceans. The paths of
our vessels, laden with petroleum and timber,
machine tools and equipment, and cotton and
ore, lead to over 1,200 ports in more than 120
countries of the world." (Marine Policy, April,
1977, pp. 107-109)
V.I. Tikhonov, Deputy Minister of the Merchant Marine,
noted that Russian ships regularly serve Asian, African and
Latin American countries by carrying millions of tons of vari-
ous kinds of equipment, vehicles, spare parts, fuels, and
building materials, in addition to Soviet technical assistance.
Soviet ships are particularly active in services to Syria,
Libya and Iraq, altough no mention is made of the enormous
supplies of military hardware with which the USSR supplies
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these countries and others within the Soviet sphere of influ-
ence(Heine, 1973, p.268).
AS previously noted, Soviet merchant ships have retained
a relatively small average size despite the economic advan-
tages inherent to operating larger ships. As Richard Ackley
has written,
"In the politics of persuas'i.on, small ships
with specialized self unloading equipment are
particularly suitable for trade with countries
lacking the sophisticated loading facilities
normally found in ports located in the indust-
rialized developed nations. Although economic
gain from trade with Third World countries is
modest, and is often pursued at a net loss in
the early stages of trade development, it ap-
pears that establishment of a foothold in the
economy and political structure of these
countries is a motivating factor for Soviet
actions. By extending aid to the developing
nations in Asia, Africa and South America, the
Soviets are able to progressively decrease the
economic dependence of these countries upon
the West, thereby making the political alter-
native of neutralism more acceptable." (Ackley,
1976, p.35)
Contributing to the effectiveness of the many port calls
made by Soviet ships to the LDC's, is the increased presenCe
ashore provided by Soviet commercial and consular representa-
tives. The modern, technologically advanced vessels operated
by the Soviet Merchant Marine serve to effectively reinforce
Soviet claims to scientific and economic supremacy and to
enhance the Soviet model as the route to rapid national
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development (Baldwin, et aI, 1969, p.76; Ackley, 1976, p.3S).
It should be noted that the Soviet commitment to some of
its client states has on occasion placed a very heavy burden
on the merchant fleet, a burden the USSR is apparently willing
to shoulder. During the Vietnam war, for example, approximately
100 merchant ships were in regular service on the Haiphong
replenishment run(Tower, 1980, p.S3). It is estimated that an
equivalent number of ships is currently employed in maintaining
trade routes to Cuba.
In supporting political objectives and providing aid to
client nations, especially Cuba, Vietnam, and some of the South
African states, the merchant marine is often employed in non-
remunerative trade. The dilemma of the Cuban economic burden is
a case in point, and one that clearly is in conflict with the
merchant marine's role in earning convertible hard currencies.
while the versatility of the merchant fleet may be viewed as a
strength of Soviet ocean capabilities, at the same time these
multiple missions are also competitive. The Cuban diversion of
the Soviet merchant marine has been a very expensive program.
closely related to the role of political influence discuss-
ed above, is the role of carrying arms to other nations. The
dramatic buildup of the merchant marine has provided a growing
capability for long range sealift that can sustain Soviet proxy
forces over extended periods. In recent years, Soviet merchant
ships have supported military operations by client states in
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Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East(Ackley, 1976, p.33;
Tower, 1980, pp.53-56). In the early 1960's, the POLTAVA class
general cargo ship became famous as a carrier of missiles to
Cuba(Sutton, 1970, p.42). In 1967, North Vietnam greeted 433
soviet vessels(Baldwin, et aI, 1969, p.75). The foregoing
examples demonstrate the capability and willingness of the
Soviets to employ the merchant marine in the arms trade. As the
USSR further develops its Ro/Ro fleet,-chis capability will be
increased.
Of the 117 developing countries listed in the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency's data, the USSR exported military equip-
ment to forty-one, primarily focusing on deliveries to the
Middle East and South Asia. From 1973 to 1977 inclusive, sales
to Egypt, Iraq, Syria, India, and Libya accounted for 59.4 per-
cent of all Soviet arms transfers to the developing world,
amounting to nearly one-third of the world's total arms exports
(Menon, 1982, p.380). Within the communist system, the Soviet
union is by far the major exporter of military hardware, easily
outdistancing its political rival, China.
During the period 1954 to 1981, the Soviet union delivered
over $60 billion worth of military equipment to the Third World.
Some $35 billion in military hardware was delivered during 1977
to 1981 alone (DIA, 1982, p.14). In addition, the arms trade
has proved to be a rather significant source of hard currency
for the Soviets. Arms sales account for approximately 9 percent
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of the Soviets total hard currency income(Ericson, et al, 1979,
p.212). Since these weapons systems require highly technical,
specialized maintenance, the Soviets have used the opportunity
to send large numbers of advisors and technicians to the
developing nations. The number has grown from 10,600 in 1977 to
more than 19,500 by the end of 1981(OIA, 1982, p.16). Personnel,
like trade and cargoes, were moved in Soviet owned and operated
shipping(Ackley, 1973, p.314). Using t~ arms transfer program,
these personnel have proven to be a major means for the Soviets
to project power and influence among the LOC's.
Arms exports have provided the USSR with an entree into
developing nations while earning a considerable economic profit.
The roughly $8 billion in arms accords signed by the Soviets
during 1981 demonstrates Moscow's willingness to employ the arms
trade as an increasingly important instrument of foreign policy,
Although the expansion of the Soviet merchant marine has
been predicated primarily on economic rationale, the capability
to supply client nations with aid and arms and to promote Soviet
policy objectives in the developing nations of the world will
continue to be an important subsidiary mission of the merchant
fleet. As a visible sign of the prestige and power of the Soviet
Union, the Merchant Marine serves as an effective instrument of
political influence.
(4) To serve as an auxiliary to the Soviet Navy. The Soviet
Merchant Marine directly supports the Soviet Navy by provision-
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ing naval vessels, fueling them on the high seas(Nietze, et
al, 1979, p.50}, providing military sealift, gathering naval
intelligence(Atlantic Council, 1979, pp. 23-26; Ackley, 1976,
p.34), and serving as training platforms(CNO, 1981, pp.62-63}.
Although the Soviet Navy is gradually building up a fleet
of very capable specialized naval support vessels operated and
manned by uniformed personnel, the Soviet fleet benefits
greatly from the use of merchant ships~in support of naval
operations. The high degree of integration between the merchant
marine and naval forces helps to minimize the adverse impact of
remote homeports and scarcity of permanent facilities in other
countries(Heine, 1973, p.269; Atlantic Council, 1979, p.23).
Although the Soviets now have access to Cam Ranh Bay, Socotra,
Mauritius, Yemen, and other areas, the merchant fleet continues
to provide essential support to deployed naval squadrons in
many parts of the world where support is unavailable(Atlantic
Council, 1979, p.23; Ackley, 1976, p.34). For instance, Soviet
warship missions into the Caribbean Sea and cruises off the
Hawaiian Islands are positive proof that the merchant service
can provide necessary logistic support to deployed naval form-
ations(Ackley, 1976, p.34). Frequently, more than 50 percent of
the replenishment of naval vessels is undertaken by mercant
ships (Martin, 1975, p.37). Merchant ship participation during
Exercise OKEAN in 1970 proved particularly extensive, further
developing the proficiency of the navy and merchant marine to
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work together in coordinated operations. On several occasions,
the author has observed Soviet combatants taking on fuel from
merchant tankers in the Mediterranean. Clearly, the Soviets
can call upon additional merchant ships to support their fleet.
and this capability is exercised regularly.
Thi s practice has the impact of substantially magni fyi ng
the effective size of the Soviet surface and conventional
submarine fleets, which would otherwis-e be required to spend a
great deal of time in transit to and from homeports for rearm-
ing and resupply and be vulnerable to attrition by enemy forces
enroute. Again, there is nothing surprising in this sensible
utilization of the merchant marine's ability to satisfy more
than one national policy objective. The United States, for
instance, recogni zes thi s potenti a 1 and, in fact, heavi ly
subsidizes the construction of defense related features into
American built merchant vessels. The interesting note here is
the degree to which the Soviet merchant marine is integrated
with the navy during peacetime, and the extensive use of
merchant vessels on missions of state that have little to do
with economic profitability.
The merchant marine is also a ready source of trained
seamen and officers for the Russian Navy. Command personnel
are taught at the Ministry of the Merchant Marine's four high-
er and 12 specialized secondary education schools. According to
Deputy Minister V.I. Tikhonov, one out of every four men in the
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merchant marine has a diploma earned from a higher or special-
ized secondary educational institution. Sea duty aboard ship
provides practical experience, and it is not unusual to find
some vessels with excessive crews in relation to their type
and size(Heine, 1973, p.270; CNO, 1981, p.63). Many of the
officers hold reserve commissions and train with their Regular
Navy counterparts on a periodic basis.
Another important mission assign~rr to all Soviet merchant
shi ps is to gather i ntelli gence whenever pos s i bl e. It is wi dely
known that Soviet vessels carry more extensive communications
packages than is normally required for commercial operations,
and many merchant ships are configured with additional staff
and equi pment to permit intelligence collection(CNO, 1981, p.63;
Atlantic Council, 1979, p.24). Stories have periodically appear-
ed in the Western press of Soviet espionage activities in
foreign ports, and there is ample opportunity to collect useful
intelligence in the unrestricted harbors of the United States.
There is also evidence to support a belief that the USSR
might arm some of their merchant ships in time of war with
weapons for their own self defense. Such weapons could clearly
be used offensively against unarmed opposition(Atlantic Council,
1979, p.25). This would not be the first time that merchant
ships were used in this type of a role. During World War I,
American Q-ships were effectively used versus German U-boats in
the North Atlantic. During both world wars, Germany made
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extensive and successful use of merchant raiders. Although no
match for a fully armed warship, in a contingency role such as
this then armed Soviet merchant vessels would represent a
serious threat to offshore oil and gas rigs or to unaccompanied
unarmed merchantmen or fishing craft. The United States has also
performed considerable research and development in the use of
American merchant ships for wartime roles, most notably the
well publicized ARAPAHO project(Mulqui-n, 1983, pp.103-106), which
employs appropriately configured merchant vessels as helicopter
landing platforms for anti-submarine warfare.
51
U.s. OBJECTIONS TO
SOVIET MARITIME PRACTICES
Any discussion of the predatory or "unfair" competitive
practices attributed to the Soviet merchant marine in the U.S.
liner trades must be viewed from a perspective of Soviet-
American maritime relations since 1972. In that year, the
United States and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics
signed a Maritime Agreement which later proved to be the cata-
lyst for the Soviets' rapid expansion into trade routes that
were generally the exclusive domain of the Western shipping
conferences prior to 1972. Soviet flag vessels until this time
seldom made port calls in U.S. ports, and the Soviet merchant
marine enjoyed only a minimal presence along traditional U.S.
trade routes. The substantial increase in Soviet commercial
activity subsequent to the 1972 Maritime Agreement must
therefore be viewed from this background.
THE US-USSR MARITIME AGREEMENT OF 1972
During the 1960·s and early 1970's, relations between the
U.S. and the USSR improved considerably as successive admin-
istrations pursued a policy of detente and Soviet-American
bilateral trade expanded. The need to create a formal, mutually
recognized framework from which to conduct commercial and
business relations between the two countries became evident
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following the 1963-1964 grain sale, when U.S. longshoremen
conducted boycotts on grain shipments to the USSR. The unions
demanded that provisions be made to ensure that a substantial
portion of the trade be carried in American-flag ships.
Accordingly, maritime negotiations were initiated in the
latter part of 1971 and culminated in the signing of the US-
USSR Maritime Agreement on October 14, 1972. The main
objectives of the Agreement were to op~ channels of maritime
commerce between the two nations by allowing specific types of
U.S. and Soviet flag vessels to make port calls in major ports
of each other, and to permit one-third of the bilateral water-
borne cargo trade between the two countries to be carried in
Soviet flag and U.S. flag ships(MARAO, 1977, pp.25-27; Kyros,
1977, pp.62-65). By this Agreement, 40 major ports in each
nation were open to visits by commercial vessels of the other
upon 48 hour advance notification of intended entry. Although
this much advance notice was still greater than the 24 hour
notice required from merchant ships of non-Communist countries,
it was significantly less than the 14 day notification required
before the Maritime Agreement.
Previous to the Agreement, the Soviet Union required a 30-
day advance notification for American vessels(Ackley, 1973, p.
275).
The significance of this relaxation of port access restric-
tions cannot be overemphasized. Without this adjustment, it is
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unlikely that Soviet expansion into the liner trades of the
United States would ever have progressed to the degree it did
(NFOIO, 1983). Under the 14 day rule, Soviet merchant ships were
discouraged from entering the liner trades since port entry
could be denied at any time prior to making landfall at U.S.
ports, and thereby risk serious disruption of cargo delivery
schedules. In the liner trades, even more so than in the charter
market, a reputation for reliable, ti~~ly service is vital.
Hence, relaxation of the 14-day notification requirement allowed
the Soviets to establish dependable cargo schedules and to begin
cargo liner service from U.S. ports.
On December 29, 1975, the Department of Commerce and the
Ministry of the Merchant Marine of the USSR signed a new Mari-
time Agreement, essentially an extension of the original 1972
Agreement, which was to expire on December 31, 1981(MARAD, 1977,
p.27).Representatives from both countries met in December of
1980 to ensure the effective implementation of the 1975 Agree-
ment. A Memorandum of Understanding was signed on January 16,
1981, which continued the use of an index for both bulk grain
carried by American ships, and agreed to make accomodations
necessary to rectify imbalances in bilateral trade. The 1975
Maritime Agreement was extended for one year pending negotia-
tions on a new Agreement(MARAD, 1981, pp.17-18, p.50).
Following the Maritime Agreement in 1972, initial service
by the Soviets was to only a few major U.S. ports, and cargoes
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were generally restricted to break bulk or general cargo ser-
vice. By 1974, the Soviets introduced their first semicontainer
ships into the U.S. liner trade, and shortly therafter began
operating small and medium sized fully cellular container
vessels. Approximately five years after entering service in the
U.S. foreign trades on general cargo, the Soviets were operating
a substantial number of modern intermodal ships with good
frequency, reasonable transit, and ofrerred at whatever price
was necessary to attract cargo(Hiltzheimer, 1978, p.29). Many
U.S. shipowners consider the signing of the 1972 Maritime
Agreement as the Pandora's Box that opened the lucrative U.S.
general cargo trade to Soviet competition (Atlantic Council,
1979, p.26). In view of the rapid penetration of the Soviets
into the U.S. liner trades subsequent to 1972, there appears to
be some justification to these concerns.
Following extensive hearings on the subject, the Congress
responded to the increasing Soviet penetration of the U.S. liner
trades by passing Public Law 95-483, the Ocean Shipping Act of
1978. The so called Controlled Carriers Act, which will be
discussed in greater detail later in this paper, permitted the
Federal Maritime Commission to regulate the rates of the Soviet
Union and other state-owned carriers to ensure that discrimina-
tory practices were avoided. As a consequence, rate cutting was
reduced substantially and Soviet presence in U.S. liner trades
diminished almost entirely.
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In January of 1980, President Carter curtailed severely
all grai n shi pments of grai n to the USSR in response to the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Concurrently, the International
Longshoremen's Association (ILA) instituted a boycott on all
cargoes transported by Soviet ships from U.S. East and Gulf
coast ports.
While the reasons given by the Soviets for their withdraw-
al from American trade routes are vague, it appears evident
that the ILA boycott and the Controlled Carrier Act influenced
that decision. Other factors have also precipitated the
reassignment of Soviet liner ships to trade routes other
than those servicing U.S. ports. Seatrade observes,
"It appears that the Soviet lines were finding
it impossible to generate a hard currency pro-
fit on the routes due to the intensive compe-
tition from other outsiders encouraged to
enter the trade by FESCO's apparent runaway
success in penetrating the market. Added to
this has been a trend for Japanese shippers to
begin to look elsewhere for carriers, partly
out of fears that the ILA boycott might spread
to the West Coast and partly out of fears that
hostilities might see their cargoes stranded
on an unfriendly carrier's ships. Most shippers
have withdrawn their support from FESCO out of
"shear commercial instinct" according to CENSA."
(Seaward, May 1980, p.3)
The U.S. lifted official trade restrictions in August, 1981,
however President Reagan shortly thereafter again imposed
economic sanctions against the USSR in response to Soviet invo~-
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ment in Poland in November of 1981. Although some Soviet ships
were still permitted to call at certain U.S. ports, the level
of trade between the United States and the USSR has not
returned to the same level of activity experienced before the
Afghanistan embargo of 1980. Accordingly, much of the analysis
that follows will antecede this period and concentrate on
Soviet maritime activity following the 1972 Agreement with the
United States.
RATE CUTTING
As they entered into a hostile U.S. market, the Soviets
used the independent carrier's traditional tactic to penetrate
into liner trades - rate cutting. By offerring to carry certain
commodities at a lower price than that quoted in the liner
tariffs, cargo is attracted from the liner conference. Having
captured a share of the market, other carriers are driven out
so that they cannot come back and prices are raised to more
profitable levels. Historically, the combined economic strength
of the conference should be sufficient to capture most cargoes
and maintain stable freight rates. In the case of state control-
led carriers such as the Soviet Union, however, the national
treasury can sustain operations along a trade route for as long
as it is politically and economically advantageous in the
national interests to do so.
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The Soviets entered trades that interested them and, like
any new independent line, offerred substantial reductions,
often as low as 40 to 50 percent below prevailing freight rates.
The outcry from U.S. shipowners was immediate and prolonged,
and articles began to appear in printed media about the
"predatory" tactics being used by the Soviet merchant marine,
and the emerging threat to Western shipping in general (Atlantic
Council, 1979, p.27). Characteristic o~ these claims were those
expressed by officials of U.S. liner companies at Congressional
hearings for the Third Flag bill in 1977 and the Controlled
Carrier Act in 1978:
"Predatory (Soviet) rate-cutting, if allowed
to go on without restraint, can bring the end
of the conference system, followed by unlimit-
ed rate wars and then bankruptcy of many lines
with massive capital and job 10sses."(State-
ment of Robert E. Mayer, Vice President, States
Steamship Co., March 8, 1978, p.17)
"While (the Soviets) continue to build them-
selves up in the Pacific, to become a great
seagoing power in crosstrading, they will, be-
cause of their rate cutting and their unethi-
cal practi ces, snuff the rest of out gradually."
(Statement of Gordon E. Bart, Senior Vice Pres-
ident, American President Lines, March 8, 1978,
p • 40)
" ••• the issue here is whether or not the United
States, with its open trade and open access po-
licy, is going to invite powerful governments
to enter our trades, dump their tonnage in our
trades with a calculated takeover philosophy,
using disruptive techniques of pricing."
(Statement of Charles I. Hiltzeheimer, Chairman
of the Board, Sea-Land Service, Inc., March 8,
1978, p.36)
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More recently, Captain J.W. Clark of the Delta Line has
expressed the concern felt by many leaders in the U.S. shipping
industry when he wrote,
"In retrospect, it seems that the Soviets
deliberately planned the 1972 agreement as a
means of destroyi ng our merchant shi ppi ng.
U.S. negotiators appear to have been duped by
Communists who held out as "bait" the prospect
of huge grain purchases and other lucrative
oppor tun i tie s •••• the rea 1 moTi vat ion for the
surging Communist fleet is to slowly but
surely dominate world shipping."(Clark, 1981,
p p , 70-71)
The Soviets themselves have seemingly corroberated the
industry's fears by printing advertisements such as the one
below, which appeared in the Siam Travel News in May of 1975,
WORRYING ABOUT TIGHT TRAVEL BUDGET, JUST REMEMBER WHO
INVENTED THE PLANNED ECONOMY
Seriously, if you're worrying about whether you can afford to
travel this year or not, you should talk to us. Or to your tra-
vel agent about us.
Because even in these fiercly competitive days of deals,
specials, excursions, group fares, student prices, youth packag-
es and even ssshhh!!! rate cutting you'll find that we can
design you a travel plan that will seat you just that much more
comfortably.
Without sacrificing any of our famous Russian-style vodka-and-
caviar hospitality that everyone tells their friends about long,
long after
How do we do this? One reason is that we don't have to make
profits. And the other is that there's one country that's really
expert in planning economical operations.
Guess who that is.
(Extracted from Hearings for H.R. 9998, March 8, 1978)
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Numerous examples of Soviet rate cutting practices
appeared in professional shipping journals, business periodic-
als and other print media throughout the 1970's. Considerable
concern was caused by the awesome future potential of state
owned carriers, particularly those of the Soviet Union, to dis-
rupt trades by slashing rates at levels that could not be
matched by commercially motivated carriers. Rate comparison
studies conducted by the Federal MaritTme Commission in 1977
showed that of the top 25 commodities moving in the export and
import sector of each trade route, the Soviets had the lowest
rate of anybody approximately 50 percent of the time and that
about 75 percent of the time the Soviets were lower than the
conference(Ellsworth, 1977, p.22).
In another rate comparison study prepared by the FMC on
major commodities moving in the U.S. Pacific Coast/Japan trade
route, the Soviet Far East Shipping Company (FESCO) charged
rates that were an average of 16 percent below prevailing con-
ference rates. Of the 21 commodities analyzed, FESCO's rates
were lower than the conference rates on 20 of the items, under-
cutting the conference tariff in one instance by 45 percent.
When compared to other independent lines, FESCO's rates were
lower in 15 out of 21 cases(Ellsworth, et al, 1981, p.471).
Pursuing a policy of aggressive rate cutting,the Soviets
realized an 8-fold increase in the tonnage of liner cargoes
carried and a nearly 45-fold increase in the value of liner
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cargoes carried between 1971 and 1976(MARAD, 1977, p.28).
Similar growth trends occurred in the non-liner and tanker
segments of Soviet operations in U.S. oceanborne trade.
Even in the containing services, rates can be based on
the values of the commodities carried in the containers or on
a "per container basis", commonly referred to as FAK, or
"freight all kinds". In this manner, Soviet operators have
also been able to penetrate the U.S. i~ermodal liner service.
As a counter charge to American claims of widespread
rate cutting practices, Soviet Minister Guzhenko has claimed
that conference members are rebating shippers with amounts
greater than the amounts attributed to Soviet carriers.
Several investigations by the Federal Maritime Commission have
indicated some validity in the charges of rebating practices
within the liner conferences(Kyros, 1977, p.14). The stiffer
system of penalties provided for in the Ocean Shipping Act of
1979, however, has probably put a lid on most of the rebating
bei ng ill egally practi ced in thi s country.
Other Russian maritime leaders voiced similar remarks in
response to criticisms of Soviet shipping policy. As early as
1968, A. Savelev, the Chairman of Sovfracht, wrote in the
Sovi et journal Vodni Transport:
"Recently, statements have appeared in the
Western press ••• accusing shipping circles in
the CEMA countries of rate cutting. These
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accusations are totally groundless. It is well
known that CEMA's commercial activities in
shipping are based on accounting principles
that provide not only for the recovery of
direct costs from the amount earned from trans-
porting freight, but also for the realization
of a profit."(extracted from Bock, 1981, p.56)
u.s. shipping interests sometimes have difficulty in
justifying their relative commercial position without accusing
for e i gnco mpet ito r s 0 f s 0 me di abo 1 i ca l--c 0 ns pira cy. Muc h 0 f the
real dilemma facing the shipping industry today stems from
worldwide overcapacity. Shipowners and operators have had to
lower freight rates to marginal levels ever since the ship-
building boom of the late 1960's and early 1970's. Precipitated
by the closing of the Suez Canal, orders for new shipping,
particularly the enormous VLCC's and ULCC's engaged in the
carriage of POL products, resulted in an overtonnage situation
when the Canal reopened. Borderline operators have been forced
to retire from the world's trade routes, and the remaining
operators have had to contend with a much more intense level
of competi ti on. Thi s exi sti ng market depressi on is further
aggravated by the appearance of a large number of developing
nations who are rapidly building up their own merchant fleets,
both as a matter of national pride, and as a means to obtain
their share of the profits and hard currency generated by the
shipping business. As a result, there are far more ships and
capacity than there are cargoes available. Although the
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emergence of a first class merchant marine such as that which
the Soviets have deployed further exacerbates an already grim
situation, the USSR cannot be held uniquely responsible for
world market conditions(Atlantic Council, 1979, p.27). The
Norwegian Shipping News indicates the main reasons for the
economic troubles of the major operating lines seem to be
-overtonnaging in the world liner market
-rampant competition
- structural cahanges in trade patterns
-investment in the wrong type of ships
-rapid fluctuation in exchange rates
-soaring interest rates
-operating delays due to inadequate
infrastructure and strikes
-i nabi 1 i ty to cope wi th the
technological revolution
-political interference
-market fluctuation
(Norwegian Shipping News, August, 1982)
In estimating the capacity of the Soviet Union to employ
its merchant marine to inflict economic injury to the U.S.
shipping industry by predatory rate cutting, Robert Athay
writes,
IIS uch fears appear to be exagerated. Soviet
economic interests will probably lead to a
much more benign shipping policy. The conti-
nued need for hard currency exchange to finance
imports from the West, and the limited oppor-
tunities available to the USSR for improving
its hard currency balances by alternative
means, creates a strong incentive for the
Soviets to maximize the earnings of these cur-
rencies by their merchant fleet. Such a policy
precludes the use of the merchant fleet pri-
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marily as an instrument of economic warfare.
Any political gains that the Soviets might
achieve by this route likely would be short
lived and would risk the loss of foreign
exchange earnings because of adverse reactions
of Western cargo owners."(Athay, 1972, p.106)
"UNFAIR" COMPETITION
The uproar resulting from the aforementioned practices of
' .
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the Soviet merchant marine resulted in legislative action by
the Uni ted States in an effort to curb "unfai r" competiti on in
the liner trade. The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-483),
also called the "Controlled Carrier Act", enabled the Federal
Maritime Commission to investigate and, if necessary, regulate
the activities of the Soviet Union and 20 other nations that
were operating state-owned lines in the U.S. trades. If Soviet
vessels were determined to be trading at "unfair" rate levels
considered by the FMC to be detrimental to the commerce of the
United States, then the Commission was authorized under the
Act to close U.S. ports to offending Soviet lines.
It is interesting to note that during Congressional
hearings for the Controlled Carrier Act, similar legislative
actions to curb Soviet encroachments had been enacted by the
governments of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, and
the Federal Republic of (West) Germany.
The passage of the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 has become
a vital element toward increasing the FMC's enforcement powers.
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The FMC's implementation of the new law began with the identi-
fication and classification of all state controlled carriers
operating in the foreign commerce of the United States. The
Commission issued 78 orders under the authority of section 21
of the Shipping Act seeking information regarding the registrYt
ownershipt and control of certain common carriers operating in
U.S. trades. On the basis of the responses received and other
information independently developed b~he Commission t 21
steamship lines were classified as state control led carriers
subject to the provisions of P.L.95-483 by the end of Fiscal
Year 1980.
Among its other duties, the FMC also monitors changes of
ownership, registry and control of carriers t their entry and
exit from conferences, and the opening of rates within confer-
ences to which controlled carriers belong, in order to stay
apprised of those carriers which may become subject to the
provisions of the Contolled Carrier Act and those which may
become totally or partially exempt. For example, section 18(c)(3)
of the Act authorizes the Commission to request from any
controlled carrier, a statement of justification which details
the need and purpose of the carrier1s tariff rates, charges,
classifications, rules or regulations being applied in a
particular trade.
Accordingly, since the 1978 enactment of P.L. 95-483, the
FMC has initiated several rate justification inquiries for the
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purpose of determining whether the rates, charges, and practices
of certain controlled carriers are just and reasonable.
Just how unfai r competi ti on is determi ned is confusi ng. The
heart of the problem is the basic difference between market and
non-market economies. The cost structure in Soviet bloc countries
is different from that in the United States, and terms such as
"profit" and "earning power" have completely different meanings
in the USSR than in America. The Sovi~~s are not bound to main-
tain any criterion of profitability similar to that required by
U.S. shipowners. Allocation of economic resources based on
government prioritization as a means to achieve political or eco-
nomic national objectives is incompatible with the Western pricing
system (Brand, 1978, p. 55). Thus, the operating costs of the
Soviet fleet can be and basi cal ly are free from those items which
represent major expenses for a commercial shipowner operating in
the U.S., such as depreciation, interest and insurance.
As described earlier in this paper, the Soviets obviously
have the capability to undercut the U.S. liner fleet, and the
motivation to do so. The need to earn convertible hard currency
is clearly of great importance, if the Soviets are to obtain the
foreign exchange necessary to pay for imports from the West. As
Robert Ell sworth wri t e s ,
"If the final selling price in hard currency
produces a greater utility than the opportunity
costs involved in the production of the goods
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or service, then the price (in hard currency)
may rationally be set at a level which is
lower than the soft currency costs. It is pos-
sible, therefore, that dumping from state-
controlled economies may persist in the ab-
sence of economies of scale, which is the
argument normally used to explain dumping of
merchandise from market economies. The econ-
omies of scale argument can be discarded as a
probable cause if the products which they are
accused of dumping are in short supply domes-
tically, so that economies, if they exist,
could be realized by expanding domestic sales."
(Ellsworth, et a l , 1981, pp . 471-472)
With this in mind, the dumping of shipping services at
reduced freight rates to obtain hard currencies can be viewed
as a logical progression of state-controlled planning to
fulfill the larger goals of the general economic plan. The
"efficiency" of merchant marine operations may therefore be
maximized. even if shipping services are provided below fully
al located costs expressed in soft currency units. The disparity
between U.S. and Soviet freight rates becomes even more pro-
nounced when the cheaper bunkers, insurance, and crew wages
afforded to Soviet lines are considered.
How then has the FMC determined whether a rate charged by
a Soviet carrier is fully compensatory or not? Section 18(c) of
the Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 specifies the following factors
must be considered when determining whether or not rates
published by a controlled carrier are just and reasonable,
For the purpose of this subsection, in determining
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whether rates ••• submi tted by a controlled carri er
are just and reasonable, the Commission may take
into account appropriate factors, including, but not
limited to, whether:
(i) The rates ••• which have been filed •.• are below a
level which is fully compensatory to the control-
led carrier based upon that carrier's actual
costs or upon its constructive costs, which are
hereby defined as the costs of another carrier,
other than a controlled carrier, operating similar
vessels and equipment in the same or a similar
trade;
(i i) the rates ••• are the sam-e- as or simi 1ar to those
rates filed or assessed by other carriers in the
trade;
(iii) the rates ••• are required to assure movement of
particular cargo in the trade; or
(iv) the rates ••• are required to maintain acceptable
continuity, level or quality of common carrier
service to or from affected ports.
Decisions rendered by the Federal Maritime Commission
against FESCO in 1979 and 1980 indicate that a two stage test
has apparently developed to determine if rates are unreasonably
low. Decisions are based on comparison to rates assessed by
similar carriers and a demonstration of injury to other carriers
in the trade. Similar procedures are followed in the merchandise
sector in accordance with the Antidumping Act of 1921 to
determine whether the prices charged by a state controlled econ-
omy firm are unreasonably low{Ellsworth, et a l , 1981, pp.479-
483). The success of the Controlled Carrier Act in meeting its
intended purposes was appropriately described by Maritime
Administrator, Admiral H.E. Shear, when he wrote,
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IISince the Commission commenced active
enforcement of the controlled carrier law re-
quiring state-controlled carriers to compete
on equal terms with their privately-owned
competitors. predatory rate-cutting by these
(Soviet) steamship lines in the u.S. foreign
commerce has virtually been e l i mi net edv "
(Shear. 1982. p.22)
CROSS TRADING
The primary activity of the Soviet merchant fleet which
most concerns U.S. shipowners is in the area of cross trade.
Third flag carriage. or crosstrading. is the traditional
maritime practice of vessels carrying cargoes between nations
other than their own. In effect. this means carrying trade that
is neither imported nor exported from the ports belonging to
the parent nation of the ship's registry. In addition to being
practiced by the Soviet Union, this is a very important source
of income for many Western shipping nations including Norway,
Sweden, Greece, Japan, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.
Soviet carriage of cross trade cargoes between foreign
ports has been expanding rapidly since the mid-1960's. The
USSR's first major efforts at crosstrading came during the
Vietnam war. Soviet ships delivered supplies to North Vietnam,
and often returned to Europe via Australia and New Zealand
where they picked up cargoes bound for Europe(Ounn, 1969, p.ix).
Cross trade carriage grew from 7.5 million tons in 1965 to 22
million tons in 1974(Carr, 1976, p.336), to more than 33.5 mil-
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lion tons in 1978(CIA, 1978, p.6).
Soviet ships were initially employed in the cross trades
in only two circumstances. As eluded to previously, one method
would be to pick up backhaul cargoes after delivering exports,
rather than steam home on the return voyage in ballast. Soviet
ships were also chartered out to foreign shippers during the
winter months when the icing of their northern ports reduced
shipping needs(Carr, 1976, p.336).
Modeling itself after Western maritime powers, however,
the Soviet Union recognized an ideal opportunity to earn hard
currency. Many Soviet ships, particularly the newer unitized
vessels, now spend full time employed in the cross trades.
Moreover, as discussed previously, in order to enter the market
the Soviets had no choice but to start operating as cross-
traders, and also as independents operating outside the various
freight conferences, many of them closed, set up around the
world(Carr, 1976, p.336; Atlantic Council, 1979, p.29).
Much of the cargo carried in cross trading operations
consisted of bulk commodities carried for CEMA trading partners
or Third World nations with payment in soft currencies. An
example of this practice would be the carriage of Canadian
flour to Cuba, or Middle Eastern oil moving to Eastern Europe
(Nitze, et al, 1979, p.149). As Soviet liner operations grew
and newer, more modern vessels were entered into service,
increasing quantities of high value manufactured goods were
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transported between the Western industrialized countries. Prior
to 1965, when Soviet crosstrading essentially began, the Soviet
Union had 31 international cargo lines, all predominately
involved in the carriage of Soviet trade(Carr, 1976, p.336). By
mid-1979, the total number of lines had risen to 74, of which
44 were heavily involved in the cross trades(CIA, 1979, p.44).
Of particular concern to U.S. operators was the remarkable
-~
ability of the Soviets to penetrate traditional U.S. trade
routes, and selectively capture a sizable share of any market
entered. Between 1971 and 1976, for instance, Soviet expansion
in U.S. liner trades rose from 0.3 percent to 2.5 percent in a
relatively short period of time. Although the total percentage
figures may not appear very high to the naked eyeball, this
percentage share corresponds to nearly 50 million tons of cargo.
On the 16 U.S. trade routes where the Soviets were most active
that year, aggregate Soviet carriage was 4.1 percent. By 1977,
the Soviet merchant marine had increased its overall share of
liner trades to 3.4 percent, and its share of the selected
routes had increased to 5.2 percent. On the U.S. North Atlantic
to West Germany trade, Soviet cross traders captured 13.1 per-
cent of the market, and on the lucrative Pacific to Far East
trade route the Soviets carried 36 percent of the total tonnage
(Ellsworth, 1977, p.26). In 1976, 13 of the top 20 commodities
by value carried by the Soviet merchant marine in the U.S.
trades were high value liner cargoes representing 36 percent of
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the total value of all cargoes carried(MARAD, 1977, p.4). The
1977 data show the following penetration levels:
Trade Route 7 (U.S. North Atlantic/
West Germany) ••••••••••••...•. 12.3 percent
Trade Route 8 (U.S. North Atlantic/
Netherl ands, Bel gi um) ••••.••••• 4.1 percent
Trade Route 10 (U.S. North Atlantic/
Mediterranean/Black Sea,
Portugal, Spain, Morocco,
and Azores) ••••••••••••••.••••• 4.0 percent
Trade Route 17 (U.S. Atlantic,Gul"r" and
Pacific/Indonesia, Malaysia,
and Singapore) •••••••••••.•••• 10.1 percent
Trade Route 21 (U.S. Gulf/UK, Ireland,
Conti nental Europe- 1ess
USSR) •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3.6 percent
Trade Route 29 (U.S. Pacific, Hawaii,
and Alaska/Far East) ••••••••••• 6.4 percent
Source: Federal Maritime Commission
Although over 50 percent of Soviet lines participate in
third flag trade, only 15 percent of all cargo moved in Soviet
ships is cross trade cargo. Table X provides a summary of the
cargo distribution among the various sectors of the Soviet
merchant marine. The percentage of cross trade relative to
total waterborne carriage increased from 6 percent in 1965 to
15 percent only ten years later. It should be noted, however,
that crosstrading as a percentage of total shipping has
remained constant since 1975. Although Soviet cross trade
increased from 30 to 33.5 million tons from 1975 to 1978, the
USSRls total trade also expanded, from 200 to 229 million tons.
This leveling off of crosstrade would seem to be consistent with
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Soviet advertisement appearing in a British shipping journal.
What's keeping
What's keeping you from sending your cargo Bait-Atlantic to the U.S.A. ?
Our container service is direct with New York as first port. Direct to Baltimore. Direct to Philadelphia. And we
can offer you a through quotation service to any inland point.
We have a regular weekly service. Every Friday. we depart from Tilbury, the only weekly container line to sail
from London for New York and Baltimore. with a fortnightly call at Philadelphia.
We cover the West Coast. Our container service via the mini-land bridge is first-class. our offices on the West Coast
make sure of that.
We'll give you dry containers, open top containers or flats all in 20's or 40's .
If you dont want a whole container we offer an L.c.L. Service from Liverpool. Bradford, Birmingham.
Avonrnouth, and of course London .
And coupled with our service Is our highly competitiye independent tariff.
So what's keeping you from using Bait-Atlantic? Why not call us and arrange a trial?
BAIT-ATLANTIC lINE
MODLINE Contact MORLlNE.(UK Gcncnl Aten,lonOI·2480nl. 0< call SIC"""" bplcn in London 101-481 85~II.nd II&hr Bchn:nd inliYUpOOI (0'.-2]6 4871) our UK ..1esacen".
Source: Sea-Land 72 a
SOVIET VESSEL SCHEDULING
IN U.S. NORTH ATLANTIC TRADE ROUTES
Following is an example a Soviet liner sailing schedule which serves to
clarify heavy Soviet crosstrading patterns and infrequency of calls at
Russian homeports. This schedule shows 16 departures from the U.S. to
Europe in a 17 day period. There is no evidence that the Soviets are
actively seeking cargo for movement to or from the USSR. Arrival dates
are shown for five european ports, none of which are in the Soviet Union.
J.
The Ba/tat/anticLine
AServiceof the BalticShippingCo. of Leningrad
WEEKLY INDEPENDENT CONTAINER & RO/RO SERVICE
ANTWERP • ROTTERDAM. BREMEN· BREMERHAVEN • HAMBURG • tTILBURY
t LE HAVRE • LENINGRAD
(Full Containers Onty For The Followmg Ports)
AMSTERDAM· DUBLIN· BELFAST· HELSINKI' AARHUS· AALBDRG • COPENHAGEN· ESBJERG .DDENSE
YEJLE THENBORG· MALMO· HELSINGBORG • STOCKHOLM· NORRKOPING· OSLO. BERGEN
Sail. ..... Sallt Sail. An. An. An. An. An•V£SSELJVOV. PlolIL IIorfelt IIltl-.
_....
Rotlcloo.
""'W'''lI H-.w a.- Til...,
Pavloorad . . . . . . . . . .V·&4 12/29 12/28 12/3"1 1/13 1/11 1/13 1/15 1/13
Palekh . . . . . .. . . . . .V-65 12/29 12/31 12/30 1/10 1/12 1/13 l/tt 1/14
Dekabrlst . . .. . . . . . .V·67 1/12 1/11 1/14 1/26 1/24 1/26 1/28 1/28
Polessk . ... .. ... . ..V·68 1/12 1/13 1/12 1/23 1/25 1/26 1/24 1/27
ITO TERMINAL 000, TIIIIII
SHEOncon. ElIZAI£TH - 5U_ t fvll <..III......I,
·R.fRo ......
SlCl""l1N'1IAlIO
• "It IMltf .
All V I•• IInI..1 0tlI0r1In Otlt. Soe)tct II~wI_t lttlco.
NORTH EUROPEAN & BALTIC PORTS
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SOVIET VESSEL SCHEDULING
IN U.S. PACIFIC TRADE ROUTES
Ivan
Syrykh
V-I
K. Paust-
ovskiy
V-4
I. Kollya- Alisher
revskiy _ Navoi
V-4 -- V-4
V. Mayak-
oVSkiy
V-9
M. Gordie-
nko
V-I
Ivan
Syrykh
V-2
BANGKOK
-
DEC. 06 DEC. 22 JAN . 12 FEB. 09 - -
PORT KELANG - DEC. 14 DEC . 29 JAN. 20 FEB. 14 -
PENANG
- -
DEC . 31 JAN. 22 FEB. 16 - -
SINGAPORE
-
JAN. 04 JAN. 06 JAN. 25 FEB. 19 - -
SARAWAK
- DEC. 26 - JAN. 28 FEB. 23 - -
TOKYO
- - - -
MAR. 05
JAPAN OUTPORT
- - - - - +
PHILIPPINES
- -
JAN. 18 FEB. 05
-
MAR. 02 APR. 02
(ct LONG BEACH (L.A)
-
JAN. 24-27 FEB.O:Hl8 FEB. 22-23 MAR. 13-17 MAR. 19-21 APR. 19-21
(C) AlAMEDA (S.F.)
-
JAN. 29-30 FEB. 09-13 FEB. 24-25 MAR. 18-19 MAR. 22-25 APR. 22-25
LONGVIEW
-
FEB.03-Q3 FEB. 15-17 FEB. 27-28 MAR. 21-22 MAR. 27 APR. 27
TACOMA
-
FEB.OS-OO FEB. 19-21 MAR. 01-02 MAR. 23-24 + +
VANCOUVER rWASH.)
-
FEB. 01-02 FEB. 22-23 MAR. 03-Q5 MAR. 25-26 + +
CANADIAN PORTS J 24/F 11 FEB. 11-18 FEB. 24-28 MAR. 06-21 M 27/A 21 APR. 12 MAY 12
NAKAODKA
-
MAR. 03 MAR. 19 APR. 03 MAY 03
- -
BANGKOK
-
MAR. 15 APR. 01 APR. 15 MAY 14 - -
SINGAPORE
-
MAR 22 APR 08 APR. 22 MAY 19
- -
PORT KELANG - MAR. 25 APR. 11 APR. 25 MAY 21 -
PENANG
-
MAR. 29 APR. 15 APR. 29 MAY 23 - -
JAPAN FEB. 22 - - - - APR. 23 MAY 23
PHILIPPINES MAR. 10 APR. 13 APR. 29 MAY 13 JUN. 02 MAY 10 JUN. 10
• General Agents
~ MDHAM ~Ma2H!~w.Jersev 07066
(2011574-1144 12 121 374- 1200
Call Toll -Free f800', 631-7359
The FESCO schedule shown above indicates again the Soviet propensity for
penetrating U.S. cross trades. During the six month period shown above,
only four port calls are made at Nakhodka, the only Soviet port in these
services.
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SOVIET VESSELS IN THE U.S. PACIFIC TRADE
Photo: courtesy Sea-Land
The 774-TEU KHUDOZHNIK IOGANSON p operated by the Far East Shipping Company
of Vladivostok, is shown here loading at the 7th Street Public Terminal at
the Port of Oakland in 1976.
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The following Soviet sailing vessel schedule for the U.S. Atlantic Coast to Mediter-
ranean trade shows no arrival or de rture dates for orts in the Soviet Union.
BLASCO fp LINE
A Service of the BlackSea Shipping Co. ofOdessa, U.S.S.R.
INDEPENDENT CONTAINER SERVICE
EVERY 10 DAYS
NAPLES. LEGHORN. GENOA • PIRAEUS. LISBON • LEIXOES • BENGHAZI
TRIPOLI • ISTANBUL. ODESSA
FROM NEW YORK 0 PHILADELPHIA • BALTIMORE
r----.- - -..
V_I. N. Y. ",11• . Ilalt . NIIlI .. l.ghom &tn.. PlratvS Portuoal
Ivan Shepelkov .. ....... 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/17 1/19 1/20 1/22 1/24
-_._-
-
Mikhail Svellov . . . ...... 1/4 - 1/8 1/18 1/20 1/21 1/23 1/25
1----- _ . .-
Nikolay Ananjev . . . . . .. . 1/12 1/13 1/14 1/24 1/26 1/27 1/29 1/31
.-
Vasily Klochkov . . . . . . . . 1/22 1/23 1/24 2/3 2/5 2/6 2/8 2/10
-
..~~a~ Shepelk~v .. . . ... .. 2/2 2/3 2/4 2/14 I 2/16 2/17 2/19 2(21
,
1--.
I
1------ - ~oast to MedBLASCO, nnounc es Med train S rvice f om U.S West Iterranesn1-------
.... . . ns Cal (212\ r91.?35 nr t» I?\ 7()1.f;4nQfn . ..
1---.
IC-----·Alla Calls ParlllOll , II C·" C6ngtsUan Sure.....'
MEDITERRANEAN
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Fast, Independent Container Service to the
Mediterranean from U.S. West Coast ports
GENOA . LEGl-fOON . NAPlES' ARAEUS . BENGHA21
TRlPOU . ISTANBUL . CDESSA
20ft and 40ft containers on chasis are available with computerized
control in transit and with complete documentation. Check our sailing
schedule for the fastest, independent service from
and to the Mediterranean.
WEST COASTIMEOITERRANEAN
MEOITERRANEANIWEST COAST
A SERVICE qF THE BLACK SEA SHIPPING COMPANY
Source: Sea-Land
As is evident from this advertisement, the Soviets pride themselves
on "fast, independent serice to and from the Mediterranean. II Ships
of the GEROI PANFILOVTSY class move containers to Genoa, Leghorn,
Naples, Lisbon, and Leixoes. Served by transhipments are the ports
of Piraeus, Istanbul, Odessa, Tripoli, and Benghazi.
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TABLE X
Soviet Cargo Oi stri buti on
(million metric tons)
Trade 1965 1970 1975 1976 1978
Category tons PC T tons PCT tons PCT tons PCT tons PCT
Total 119.3 100 161. 9 100 200.0 100 21 4. 5 100 229.0 100
Soviet Ill. 8 94 146.9 91 170.0 85 184. 1 86 195.5 85
Intern'l 50.0 42 75.3 47 90.9 45 104. 1 49 120.0 52
Domestic 61.8 52 71.6 44 79. 1 40 80.0 37 75.5 33
Cross trade 7.5 6 15.0 9 30.0-- 15 30. 4 1 4 33.5 15
':~: Source: Central Intelligence Agency report ER79-1 0 490 , 1979, p.6
the previously described principal employment of the merchant
marine for carrying Soviet trade. While the benefits of crosstrad-
ing are fully recognized by the USSR, the Soviets have historical-
ly used the merchant fleet primarily for the carriage of its own
trade. Hence, systematic expansion of third flag carriage would
probably occur only if the level of international trade conducted
by the Soviet Union declines, or if the already rapid rate of
growth of the Soviet merchant marine accelerates exponentially.
Neither of these occurrences is likely to prevail in light of past
behavior and currently perceived national priorities.
FREIGHT CONFERENCES
In managing its 74 international shipping lines, the Soviet
merchant marine prefers to operate its vessels as independent
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carriers rather than joining the conference system. For this,
the Soviets have often been criticized.
As non-conference carriers, Soviet shipping lines operated
in the general cargo and unitized trades along key routes such
as those serving the important North Pacific between the Far
East and the U.S. Pacific Coast. On the lucrative North Atlantic
trade route, the Soviets were charging freight rates that were
at least 15 percent below those offerF~d by the conference lines
(Carr, 1976, p.337). It should be noted, however, that other
independent carriers normally follow the same practice.
At the time of the widely publicized rate cutting accusa-
tions in the mid-1970·s, and after the Soviets had solidified
their position as independents along the key trade routes, U.S.
operators began to approach the Soviets to try to induce them
into the conference system(Atlantic Council, 1979, p.31). Many
conferences were prepared to accept the Soviets on the theory
that it is easier to control them from inside the conference
than as an outside independent(Heine, 1974, p.269). U.S.
shipowners hoped that by joining the conference system, the
Soviet propensity for rate cutting would be restrained.
Although the Soviets have never indicated that they intend
to avoid conference memberships as a matter of shipping policy,
there do appear to be several reasons why Soviet steamship
lines have not participated in very many conference agreements.
One of the principal reasons why the Soviet Union built up its
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merchant marine in the first place was to reduce the heavy
drain placed on its hard currency reserves and also to earn
convertible hard currencies. Consequently, the USSR can be
expected to pursue maximum earnings from shipping by resorting
to competitive freight rates to attract cargo(Adam, et al,
1976, p.360). Participation in the conference framework may
serve to limit Soviet aspirations in this regard.
Another reason why the Soviets mttY avoid joining the liner
conferences can be attributed to a general reluctance to report
trade statistics and other proprietary information to a foreign
body(Adam, et al, 1976, p.360). Since the Soviets do not
maintain and report statistical information in the same manner
as Western nations do, the normally secretive Russians may be
reluctant to divulge data that may be considered sensitive
elsewhere in the Soviet bureaucracy.
One other reason, at least initially, may have been that
many of the cargoes carried in Soviet liner vessels were moving
on trade routes that were not subject to conference rates(Heine,
1973, p.269). This is no longer the situation today, however.
As the USSR enlarged its scope of operations through the
addition of new vessels, Sovfracht and Soviet shipping lines
sought membership in nongovernmental international maritime
organizations and even some shipping conferences(Heine, 1973,
p.269). As Soviet shipping activities became global in scope
and authorities less parochial in their outlook, membership in
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some shipping conferences and pooling agreements appeared
advantageous in some instances(Heine and Coe, 1967, p.25). In
general, the Soviets became less reluctant to join the liner
conferences if it was clearly in their best interest to do so
on a particular trade route. This position was affirmed by
Soviet representatives in informal discussions in 1974
between the Federal Maritime Commission and shipping officials
of the Baltic Steamship Company(Adam, -~t al, 1976, p.360).
There are several potential advantages to the Soviets
favoring their participation in the liner conferences serving
u.S. trade areas. Some of these advantages are:
1. A voice in formulating policy and developing rate
structures in a particular trade.
2. Where a conference dual rate system is in effect,
the Soviets gain access to a directory of shippers signing
the merchant's freighting agreement. These merchants would
be authorized to ship their cargo on Soviet vessels at the
lower contract rates.
3. A contribution to and a consequent benefit from
stable rate conditions in the trade.
4. The possibility of destructive rate wars- that in
the long run are harmful to everyone concerned- would be
minimized.
5. The avoidance of complaints by American Merchant
Marine operators, labor unions and ultimately, their rep-
resentatives in Congress. Such complaints, and those
arising from carriers of other nations, could generate
formal hearings and investigations before the FMC. As
Conference members the Soviets would benefit from Confer-
ence representation, thereby avoiding direct legal
confrontation.
(Kyros, 1977, p.68; Adam, et al, 1976, pp.359-360)
The long term economic interest of the Soviet Union may be
76
better served by adhering to the international norms of liner
shipping, joining the shipping conferences as appropriate. By
participating as members of the liner conferences, rate setting
is stabilized providing an environment conducive to ship modern-
ization and reasonable return on investment. Although in the
short run, increased hard currency gains may be attractive, in
the long run a more stable hard currency income from a reason-
able share of the shipping market may ~e more profitable.
There is, however, a broader context for the Soviet Union
to join the shipping conferences and become a stabilizing
factor in the world economy. If the USSR is to improve its
balance of payments position, it needs cooperation from the
West, particularly the United States. In this broader context,
the Soviet Union must balance the effect of unfair maritime
practices in the balance sheet of US-USSR commercial relations.
In the long run, a policy of predatory rate cutting for short
run hard currency gains will be detrimental to the Soviet
Union's other maritime needs and long term interest in economic
interchange with the United States.
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THE SOVIET MERCHANT MARINE IN CONTEXT
The long held view that the expansion of the Soviet mer-
chant marine is responsible for the current situation in world
liner shipping fails to take into account the rapid build up
of the ocean carrying capabilities of the developing nations
and the convenience fleets. Also, most statistical analyses
overlook the increased carrying capacity intrinsic to fully
cellular containerized vessels. A substantial percentage of
the ships registered under the flags of convenience are
owned by the United States and other Western maritime powers,
many of which are employed in the liner trades. In addition,
the vast preponderence of containerized carriers are owned
and operated by Western nations, particularly the United States.
Hence, a careful examination of the growth trends in these areas
is especially important when evaluating the build up of the
Soviet merchant marine and its penetration into the liner trades
of the United States.
The statistical comparisons and analysis that fol lows is
necessarily constrained to the period 1970 through 1980. Lloyd's
Register was used as the principal source from which statistical
data was obtained, and differentiation by vessel types was not
documented prior to 1970.
As previously described in this paper, the Soviet merchant
fleet expanded tremendously since the early 1960's, and certainly
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this trend continued during the 1970's. The general cargo
fleet of the USSR grew from 5.94 million gross registered tons
(m.grt) in 1970, to 8.06 m.grt ten years later. This increase
in liner capabilities works out to a 22.8 percent growth. as
compared to a world rise of 15.2 percent over the same period.
Tabl e XI below illustrates thi s performance.
TABLE XI
~ ::" Liner Fleet Totals (Unweighted)(million gross registered tons)
OECD US USSR CEMA FOC
1970 49. 1 44 10.736 5.942 8.832 7. 126
1980 44.611 5.968 8.060 11.993 19.083
Source: Lloyd's Register,
During this same decade, the U.S. liner fleet(i .e., single
and multi-deck general cargo ships, barge carrying and cellular
vessels) dropped from a position of unchallenged world leader-
ship boasting 10.74 m.grt to less than 6 m.grt in mid-1980. The
other developed nations of the West did little better as the
OECD countries saw their percentage share of the world liner
fleet inventory shrink from 60 percent to less than 34 percent.
Table XII pertains. Meanwhile, based primarily on the impressive
growth of the Soviet liner fleet, the CEMA nations expanded their
collective tonnage in the world liner market from 8.83 to 11.99
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Table XI I
Percentage Share of
World Liner Fleet Total (Unweighted)
OECD US USSR CEMA FOC
1970 60.0 13. 1 7.3 10.8 8. 7
1980 33.9 4.5 6. 1 9.1 1 4.5
m.grt.
These factors, combined with intense intraconference com-
petition, over tonnaging in the liner trades, and the ability
of the Soviets and other state operated carriers to charge
lower freight rates, resulted in increasing alarm in U.S.
shipping circles that a fundamental shift in the East-West
balance of power had occurred. The Congressional hearings for
the Third Flag Act in 1975 and 1976 (H.R. 7940), and the
Controlled Carrier Act in 1977 and 1978 (H.R. 9998) witnessed
substantial concern among industry leaders that the Soviet
liner fleet was inflicting irrevocable and diabolical harm to
U.S. oceanborne trade.
While the Controlled Carrier Act has effectively limited
predatory practices in the U.S. liner trade, the perceived
shift in the maritime balance of power remains of some concern
to U.S. shipowners and government agencies. As Tables XI and
XII illustrate, however, a significant portion of the world
liner fleet's new tonnage is now registered under the flags of
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convenience of Liberia, Panama, Singapore, Honduras. Cyprus.
Bermuda, Somali, and the Camayan Islands. The FOC fleet stood
at only 7.1 m.grt in 1970, mushrooming to nearly 19.1 m.grt a
decade later. This dramatic growth corresponds to a 269 percent
increase in fleet size. and a share of the world liner market
nearly twice that enjoyed ten years previously.
It should be noted that together with certain Far Eastern
owners, CENSA and the United States dominate both the true
management and beneficial ownership of the convenience fleet
(Lloyd's Shipping Economist, September, 1980, p.3). In contrast,
the Soviet bloc very seldom employs the use of conveniently
registered vessels.
Paralleling the dramatic growth of the flags of convenience
fleet is the increasing appearance of vessels from developing
nations (including the PRC) along the trade routes of the world.
Anxious to develop their merchant marines as a prerogative of
national pride and self sufficiency, these countries have
accounted for nearly 9 m.grt of the world's new liner vessels
since mid-1970. By mid-1980. the merchant navies of China and
the Third World accounted for 16.25 m.grt. or approximately 19.4
percent of the world liner fleet. This total is only slightly
less than the combined strength of the FOC liner fleet.
Growth of the FOC and LDC liner fleets notwithstanding, the
other key element in the liner trades that is often overlooked
when comparing merchant marine statistics is the increased
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carrying capacity, improved turnaround time and superior
operating efficiency made possible by using fully cellular
containerized vessels. As the comparative advantages to using
fully containerized vessels became evident during the late
1960's and early 1970's, more and more U.S. shipowners retired
their older break bulk vessels replacing them with newer, fully
cellular ships. The inherently greater cargo capacity per gross
registered ton for a container ship r~rative to its conventional
break bulk counterpart is seldom considered when statistical
comparisons are made. With the industrialized nations of the
OECD comprising more than 74 percent of the world's fully cel-
lular containerships, and the CEMA nations operating less than
3 percent, it seems intuitive that the West's true cargo capacity
is greater than the statistical summaries would indicate. The
USSR, it should be noted, was the only CEMA country operating
fully containerized ships as of mid-1980.
In an effort to place the world liner fleet into better
perspective, a system of weighting which attempts to compensate
for the increased productivity value of a fully cellular gross
ton as compared to the gross tonnage of a general cargo ship has
been built into Tables XIII and XIV. To take into account the
added capability and capacity of containerships relative to
conventional cargo liners, a factor of 5:1 was adopted for the
sake of comparison (Marti, 1981). The 5:1 cellular/general cargo
index ratio will be used to show the evolution of the combined
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liner fleet in a more realistic way than by attributing to
general cargo vessels the same tonnage value as fully cellular
containerships. The Time-Series Graph which follows will
further illustrate liner fleet growth trends.
Table XIII
Liner Fleet Totals (Weighted)
(mil 1ion s 0 f gr 0 s s reg i s..t.e red ton s )
1970
1980
OECo
56.696
78.003
US
14. 184
13.588
USSR
5.942
9.352
CEMA
8.832
13.285
FOC
8.057
24.143
Source: Lloyd1s Register
Table XIV
Percentage Share of
World Liner Fleet Total (Weighted)
1970
1980
DECO
69.2
59.3
US
17.3
10.3
USSR
7.3
7. 1
CEMA
10.8
10.1
FOC
9.8
18.3
As seen in the tables above, the U. S. liner fleet's cargo
carrying capacity declined much less dramatically than would
appear from viewing Tables XI and XII. Similarly, the DECO liner
fleet also regressed, but at a much lesser rate than was in
evidence initially. And within the DECO, there were several
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sustantial gains, most notably Greece (103 percent growth),
Japan (76 percent growth), and West Germany (97 percent
growth). Although there was a net reduction in market share
from 69.2 to 59.3 percent, overall growth in OECO liner fleet
tonnage jumped by 37.6 percent.
Most significantly, however, is the observation that CEMA
bloc, and specifically the Soviet merchant marine, also lost
some of its relative share of the worl-~ liner market. Like the
OECD and U.S. liner operators, the Soviets experienced a fall
in its relative share despite positive gains in the development
of its general cargo fleet.
The largest shift of the world's balance of power in the
liner trade during 1970 to 1980 was clearly in the direction of
the FOC fleet. On a weighted scale adjusted for the increased
productivity of containerships. the FOC fleets experienced a
remarkable absolute growth of nearly 200 percent, almost
doubling their previous share of the world market to better
than 18 percent. This dramatic growth should not be ignored
when addressing the impact of the Soviet Union's merchant
marine. To do so would give a false impression of the East-West
balance of economic power in world shipping. Bruno Bock
corroberates this sentiment well in writing,
lilt would be wrong to consider the Western
maritime nations in isolation by overlooking
the large tonnage operated by Western ship-
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ping companies under the so-cal led flags of
conveni ence. II (Bock, 1981, p.9)
In the quarterly supplement to Fairplay International
Shipping Weekly,"World Ships On Order", the Soviets appear to
be constructing new ships along the lines of previously noted
trends. Tables XV and XVI show world orderbook tables as of 20
January 1983. Although additional emphasis is being placed on
the construction of containerships, many of these vessels are
not fully cellular and characterize the Soviet propensity for
bui 1di ng shi ps substanti ally small er than is ' average for the
major maritime powers. While this provides many benefits to the
Soviets as previously described, nonetheless, it inhibits the
economic utility of these ships in head on competition with the
larger and more capable vessels of the U.S. and other major
shipping countries.
Table XV
Dry-Cargo Ships, Excluding Container Ships on Order
Number DWT Ave. DWT
us SR. 0 •••••••• 0 •••••• 1 19
J a pan • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .73
Pan ama••••••••••••••• • 42
Germany(West) ••••••••• 72
Po1and •••••••• 0 ••••••• 29
China ••••••••••••••••• 26
Nort h Korea ••••••••••• 19
Turkey •••••••••••.•.•. 38
Liberia l ?
Ot her s ••••••••••••••• 278
Total 713
693,784
672,998
633,050
554,459
274,900
273,500
204,500
195,500
182,485
1,701,305
5, 386, 481
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5,830
9,219
15,073
7,701
9,479
10,519
10,763
5,145
10,734
6,376
7,555
Table XVI
Container Ships on Order
Number
United States .••••••••• 29
Taiwan ............•..•. 12
Germany(West) .•••••••.• 29
USSR ••••••••••••••••••• 24
Kuwait •...•.•••...•.••.. 8
Singapore •••••••••••••• 11
Po1and .•••••••••••••••• 15
J apa n•••••• 0 ••••••••••• 10
Panama ••••••••••••••••• 14
Holland ••••••••.•••.•••. 7
Denmark •••••••••••••••• !7
Fra nc e •••..•.••..••..• 0 .5
Brazil l l
Norway •••••••••••••••••• 4
Sweden •••••••••••••••••• 4
Great Britain ••••••••••• 5
Saudi Arabia •••••••••••• 3
Liberia ....•........... 16
Belgium •••••••••...••.•. 4
othe r s •••••••••••••••• . 43
Tota 1..••••••••.•••.•• 271
DWT
368,740
357,600
319,720
286.960
284.000
248.000
2 45.500
no,700
208.310
179,500
169,400
164,890
136,880
128,600
128.250
117,850
115,500
114,700
103,900
350,950
4,249,950
Ave. DWT
12,715
29,800
11,025
11.957
35,500
22 • 5 45
16,367
22,070
14,879
25,643
9,965
32,978
12,444
32 , 150
32,063
23,570
38,500
7,169
25,975
8,162
15,682
Source: Fairplay, World Ships on Order, 20 January 1983
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CONCLUSIONS
1. Despite the unprecedented growth of the Soviet merchant
fleet, it remains a small percentage of world totals and will
probably remain as such for many years. The Soviet merchant
marine has developed primarily in response to economic stimuli.
Although political and military benefits are realized through
the existence of a strong merchant marTne, these benefits
should be considered ancillary.
2. The Soviets have established realistic objectives for their
merchant marine which will permit them to meet their domestic
and foreign shipping requirements, earn convertible currencies
to assist in the balance of payments, implement political
endeavors in the lesser developed nations of the Third World,
and provide an auxiliary force for the Soviet Navy. While the
Soviets have enjoyed considerable success in achieving these
objectives, the realities of the situation indicate that in
practice their merchant marine cannot serve two masters. That
is, the Soviets cannot be expected to achieve the objectives
cited and, at the same time, engage in deliberate economic
warfare aimed at domination of the world's trade routes.
3. The Ocean Shipping Act of 1978 has successfully curtailed
Soviet expansion into U.S. liner trades. Although the Soviet
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merchant marine, as a centralized, state-operated enterprise,
has the potential of seriously disrupting the commercial
stability of the U.S. liner trades, the aforementioned maritime
objectives of the Soviet Union mitigate against the likelihood
of this occurence. In this regard, greater participation in the
conference system may be expected as the Soviets begin to
return to the U.S. liner trades.
4. The development of the Soviet merchant marine should not be
blamed for the decline in the relative strength of the U.S.
liner industry during the past decade. Other more fundamental
economic problems, such as excess capacity, created largely by
miscalculation of supply and demand, are responsible. The
United States must find more positive ways to survive the
existing shipping depression and to prepare itself for other
potential economic competitors, including the mushrooming
fleets of the Third World.
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